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Private Company Lies
ELIZABETH POLLMAN*

Rule 10b–5’s antifraud catchall has been called one of the most consequential pieces of American administrative law and one of the most
highly developed areas of judicially created federal law. Although the
Rule broadly prohibits securities fraud in both public and private company stock, the vast majority of jurisprudence, and the voluminous academic literature that accompanies it, has developed through a public
company lens.
This Article illuminates how the explosive growth of private markets
has left huge portions of U.S. capital markets with relatively light securities fraud scrutiny and enforcement. Some of the largest private companies by valuation grow in an environment of extreme information
asymmetry and with the pressure, opportunity, and rationalizing culture
that can foster misconduct and deception. Many investors in the private
markets are sophisticated and can bear high levels of risk and significant
losses from securities fraud. It is increasingly evident, however, that private company lies can harm a broader range of shareholders and stakeholders as well as the efficiency of allocating billions of dollars for
innovation and new business. In response to this underappreciated problem, this Article explores a range of mechanisms to improve accountability in the private markets and ultimately argues for greater public
oversight and enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the world’s great inventors, Thomas Edison, bemoaned the propensity
of technologists to lie about an exciting new invention of the late-nineteenth
century, the storage battery. In Edison’s words: “The storage battery is, in my
opinion, a catch-penny, a sensation, a mechanism for swindling by stock[]
companies. . . . Just as soon as a man gets working on the secondary battery it
brings out his latent capacity for lying.”1
More than a century later, CEO–founder Elizabeth Holmes of blood-testing
startup Theranos found inspiration in Edison—but rather than making the world a
better place, she created a company valued at over $9 billion that was nothing
more than a dangerous house of cards.2 At age nineteen, Holmes dropped out of
Stanford University to develop groundbreaking blood-testing technology that
could use just a drop of blood.3 Over the next dozen years, Holmes became a

1. Interview by the New York Sunday Herald with Thomas Edison, in 10 THE ELECTRICIAN: A
WEEKLY JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ELECTRICITY AND CHEMICAL PHYSICS., 329, 329–31
(1883).
2. See John Carreyrou, SEC Charges Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes with Fraud, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 14, 2018, 10:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-theranos-and-founder-elizabethholmes-with-fraud-1521045648.
3. Id.
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celebrity CEO–founder, raising over $700 million from investors, building a
board with high-profile directors, and claiming that she had developed a revolutionary portable blood analyzer.4
Reporting by the Wall Street Journal exposed a devastatingly different story told
by employees who suggested that Theranos had falsified lab records to make it look
like its blood-testing technology met the industry standard.5 According to employees, the vast majority of tests that Theranos offered to consumers were actually
being run on commercial devices made by third-party manufacturers.6 The small
number of blood tests being run on Theranos devices were unreliable and posed a
public health threat to consumers.7 Under Holmes’s leadership, the company operated in a high-pressure and secretive environment,8 with “information compartmentalized so that only she had the full picture of the system’s development.”9 Many
venture capitalists declined the opportunity to invest in Theranos when Holmes
refused to provide specific information about the technology for due diligence—but
that did not stop her from raising millions of dollars from an assortment of wealthy
investors.10 As a matter of corporate governance, Holmes allegedly misled the
board11 and had supermajority voting stock that gave her the opportunity to override
any controls that might otherwise be put in place.12
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched an investigation, finding that in addition to misleading representations about the state of
Theranos technology, Elizabeth Holmes and another executive had told
investors that the company would generate more than $100 million of revenue in 2014, when in fact, Theranos had barely $100,000 of revenue that
year.13 These revelations spurred the spectacular fall of the company, going
from a $9 billion valuation to virtually zero.14 Holmes settled fraud charges
with the SEC in 2018, still maintaining that she had done nothing wrong.15

4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 33 (2018).
9. Id. at 20.
10. See id. at 16.
11. Id. at 50.
12. Id. at 298.
13. Carreyrou, supra note 2. In addition, the SEC found that Holmes had falsely claimed that
Theranos’s products were deployed by the U.S. Department of Defense on the battlefield in Afghanistan.
Id.
14. See id.
15. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President
Balwani Charged with Massive Fraud (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/201841 [https://perma.cc/Q7AF-LXRT]; see also Mary McNamara, Opinion, The Elizabeth Holmes Story Is
Not About the Black and the Blinks, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
entertainment/la-et-elizabeth-holmes-con-artist-20190325-story.html (noting that several people who
knew Holmes reported that Holmes believed that she was on a “noble mission,” which justified “fudg[ing]
the truth” and that she would eventually succeed).
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Subsequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought criminal charges
against Holmes.16
Theranos rings the alarm bell on securities fraud in the private market. Telling
lies in connection with the purchase or sale of stock is not new and dates back to
before Edison’s time.17 But since twentieth-century securities law created the
notion of a public–private company divide, securities fraud on the private side of
the line has received little attention because in conventional accounts, this market
features only sophisticated investors who can fend for themselves.18 A different
reality, however, has started to become clear—the zone of impact extends farther
and may include retail investors exposed to private companies through mutual
and pension funds and employees who hold stakes in private companies through
their stock options. Ripple effects reach other stakeholders as well, such as consumers who use a company’s product or services, like those who received faulty
blood tests from Theranos.19 Moreover, the relative dearth of enforcement in the
private market, which is surging in size and opaque with respect to the pervasiveness of securities fraud, gives rise to serious concerns about efficient capital allocation for funding innovation that drives our economic growth and deadweight
costs that investors might incur to protect themselves.
Consider another example. WeWork, a shared workspace startup, went from
having Goldman Sachs publicize a $63 to $96 billion valuation for its initial public offering (IPO) to teetering on the brink of bankruptcy within just thirty-three
days.20 Upon releasing information for the planned offering, public market
investors responded with scathing criticism of the company’s losses and corporate governance—WeWork shelved the IPO plans, and its private valuation of
$47 billion plummeted by seventy percent almost immediately.21 The CEO–
16. See Dorothy Atkins, Ex-Theranos CEO’s Criminal Trial Moved to 2021 Due to Virus, LAW360
(Aug. 11, 2020, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1300212/ex-theranos-ceo-s-criminal-trialmoved-to-2021-due-to-virus. As of fall 2020, Holmes awaits trial on criminal charges and faces up to
twenty years in prison if she is convicted. See Peter J. Henning, What’s Next for Elizabeth Holmes in the
Theranos Fraud Case?, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/business/
dealbook/holmes-theranos-fraud-case.html.
17. See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 9 (2017)
(discussing the history of policing business fraud).
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. For a discussion of harm from securities fraud to nonshareholders, see generally Urska Velikonja,
The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887 (2013).
20. See, e.g., Dakin Campbell, How WeWork Spiraled from a $47 Billion Valuation to Talk of
Bankruptcy in Just 6 Weeks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/weworks-nightmare-ipo; Peter Eavis & Michael J. de la Merced, WeWork I.P.O. Is Withdrawn as
Investors Grow Wary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/business/
wework-ipo.html.
21. Campbell, supra note 20. Several years earlier, a former WeWork employee shared an internal
document with reporters that showed the company was falling significantly short of its financial goals.
Herbert Lash, WeWork Sues Ex-Employee for Disclosing Information to Reporters, REUTERS (July 16, 2016,
6:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-property-wework-lawsuit/wework-sues-ex-employee-fordisclosing-information-to-reporters-idUSKCN0ZW162 [https://perma.cc/LP8V-TG4S]. WeWork reported
the employee’s unauthorized disclosure to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, claimed that the information did not
reflect its “operating momentum,” and then sued the former employee. Id.
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founder attempted to parachute out of the company with a billion-dollar payout,
while various investors faced steep losses—as did thousands of employees whose
stock options went to zero.22 The SEC is currently investigating WeWork for rule
violations in its abandoned public stock issuance—and it remains to be seen
whether the extensive conflicts and irregular financial reporting that have come to
light might portend possible securities fraud violations going back to the decadelong period in which the company raised money privately in relative darkness
without the regulator’s scrutiny.23
Notably, the federal antifraud catchall of Rule 10b–5 applies to both public and
private company securities.24 This provision makes it “unlawful for any person . . .
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”25 Rule 10b–5 is
“the principal font of the law of securities fraud” and “can make a plausible claim
to being the most consequential piece of American administrative law.”26 Chief
Justice Rehnquist famously remarked that the law of Rule 10b–5 is “a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”27 Indeed, securities
fraud is “one of the most heavily judicially created bodies of federal law”28—but

22. See Eliot Brown, WeWork Employee Options Underwater as Ex-CEO Reaps, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
23, 2019, 6:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-employees-feel-sting-as-ex-ceo-stands-toreap-11571870011?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2. WeWork’s largest investor, SoftBank, later
withdrew the offer to provide a payout to the CEO–founder, resulting in litigation. Peter Eavis, Adam
Neumann, WeWork’s Former Chief, Sues SoftBank, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/05/05/business/adam-neumann-softbank-lawsuit.html.
23. See Matt Robinson, Robert Schmidt & Ellen Huet, WeWork Is Facing SEC Inquiry into Possible
Rule Violations, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-11-15/wework-is-said-to-face-sec-inquiry-into-possible-rule-violations (noting that the SEC is
reviewing WeWork’s business and its disclosures to investors, and that the company was known for
using “unconventional accounting metrics”). WeWork shareholders have already sued for breach of
fiduciary duty and for fraud under state securities law, and the possibility of a suit for Rule 10b–5
securities fraud hangs in the air as some of the company’s investors claim to have been unaware of the
extent of the alleged self-dealing, having been granted neither financial materials nor disclosures prior to
the release of its IPO prospectus. See Rey Mashayekhi, WeWork’s Legal Floodgates May Have Just
Opened, FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/11/19/wework-softbanktakeover-lawsuits/; Nicholas Rizzi, Investors Sue WeWork Over Botched IPO, COM. OBSERVER (June 4,
2020, 11:03 AM), https://commercialobserver.com/2020/06/investors-sue-wework-over-botched-ipo.
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(c) (2020).
25. Id. § 240.10b–5.
26. Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 540 (2011); id. n.84 (“The rule
has sparked thousands of lawsuits, causing billions of dollars to change hands,” has “routinely spawned
headlines in the nation’s leading papers,” and has “sent hundreds of people to prison, some for
decades.”).
27. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); see also 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL
SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1287–88 (6th ed. 2011)
(“The Rule 10b-5 story tempts the pen, for it is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus
juris in which the interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking and judicial processes has
produced so much from so little.”).
28. Buell, supra note 26, at 545; see also Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990) (“With the explosive growth of rule l0b-5
litigation, courts and private plaintiffs have assumed by default a substantial segment of the policysetting powers that Congress delegated to the SEC in 1934.”).
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this voluminous case law, and the related scholarly literature, has focused primarily on public corporations and markets.29
This state of the world, with Rule 10b–5 actions aimed at public corporations
and little regard given to private corporations, sufficed for a time. Most corporations of significant size were publicly reporting and traded on national securities
exchanges, exposed to the threat of class action lawsuits brought by plaintiffs’
attorneys using case law that enabled aggregate litigation seeking compensatory
damages.30 By contrast, private placements were composed of sophisticated
investors and there was little secondary trading of private company stock.31
Startups on average were on a timeline to be acquired or go public within a few
years, and valuations did not surpass, or even approach, a billion dollars.
This twentieth-century model of a dominant public capital market has been
transformed. Capital formation through private placements has exploded in the
past decade. Nonregistered securities offerings totaled more than $3 trillion in
2017—far outpacing public offerings for stocks and bonds.32 Companies have
stayed private longer on average, fewer companies have gone public, and those
that do tend to be larger in size.33 In simple terms, this means that a significant
part of the life cycle of a growth company is typically occurring in the private
rather than the public market. For example, if Amazon, Google, and Salesforce
had stayed private for the “new normal”—an average of twelve years—an additional $197 billion in growth would have occurred in the private market.34
Venture capitalists now refer to the mega rounds of financings in late-stage startups as “private-IPOs.”35 Marketplaces for trading private company stock have

29. The vast scholarly literature on Rule 10b–5 securities fraud focuses on issues related to public
companies, and the literature discussing private companies and Rule 10b–5 is comparatively scarce: see,
for example, Carlos Berdejó, Small Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting Local
Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 WASH. L. REV. 567, 570–73 (2017); Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of
Different Heights for Securities Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 47, 53;
Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 216–21 (2012);
Kenneth J. Black, Note, Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits to Discipline a
Transforming Industry, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 271, 271–72 (2013); Robert E.
Steinberg, Note, A New Approach to Rule 10b-5: Distinguishing the Close Corporation, 1978 WASH.
U. L.Q. 733, 735–76.
30. See infra Section I.B.
31. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012)
(“Before the direct market came about, the transaction costs of trying to sell noncontrolling interests in
private start-ups were prohibitive.”); Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 152 (2010) (“At one time, federal law confined private placements to
purchasers who were sophisticated in business affairs and could, in the words of the U.S. Supreme
Court, ‘fend for themselves.’” (quoting SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953))).
32. SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, SEC, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2017, at 7 (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/K9YB-XS4P].
33. See infra Section II.A.
34. MARK SUSTER & CHANG XU, UPFRONT VENTURES, IS VC STILL A THING? 25 (2019), https://
www.slideshare.net/msuster/is-vc-still-a-thing-final [https://perma.cc/7ZA5-7HUQ].
35. Id. at 26.
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become part of the ecosystem.36 The rise of the private market has consequently
sharpened scholarly and regulatory focus on the health of the public market and
on democratizing retail investors’ opportunities to fund high-risk and potentially
high-growth private companies.37
As the SEC considers dramatically expanding retail investor access to private
investments,38 this Article argues that it is time to examine in-depth the issue of
securities fraud in private companies. Federal securities law and doctrine has oriented our system around a public–private divide with class actions serving as the
driving force in securities fraud enforcement—but only against public companies.39 Due to a variety of obstacles and economic realities, securities fraud class
actions have been absent in the private market.40 Although public enforcement
plays an important role in policing securities fraud, there is no sign that it has
kept pace with recent developments. Meanwhile, significant information asymmetries characterize stock issuances and trading in the private market, as well as
the kind of pressure, opportunity, and rationalizing culture that can foster misconduct and deception.41
Given the great potential for harm, particularly to unsophisticated shareholders
and other stakeholders, as well as the importance of deterring fraud to ensure efficient capital allocation, this Article further argues that the status quo no longer
suffices—a response is due. The path forward should aim to protect the integrity

36. See infra Section II.A.
37. See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL
STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 165 (2016) (“Also alarming for the SEC is
whether economic forces are leading to an eclipse of the public corporation, so that public equity
gradually becomes less available as an investment opportunity.”); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s
Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3389–90 (2013) (arguing for general public participation
in the private market via mutual fund investment because inequality of investor access “lets the rich get
richer, while the poor get left behind”); Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case
Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory
Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2017) (arguing “that the [mutual funds’] new interest in
venture investing poses several potential investor-protection concerns”).
38. See Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. 11 (2019) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clayton%20Testimony%
2012-10-191.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZK9-U75A] (noting the SEC has an “obligation to explore whether
we can increase opportunities for Main Street investors in the private markets while maintaining strong
and appropriate investor protections”); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Seeks Public
Comment on Ways to Harmonize Private Securities Offering Exemptions (June 18, 2019), https://www.
sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-97 [https://perma.cc/WL2W-FAGY] (stating that the SEC is
considering whether to allow retail investors greater exposure to growth-stage companies and whether to
revise the limitations on who can invest in exempt offerings); see also Tara Siegel Bernard, Opening the
Door to Unicorns Invites Risk for Average Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/01/04/your-money/investing-private-market-startups.html (noting that the SEC granted
certain individuals in the investment sector access to the private markets and expects to further open
access to private markets in the future).
39. See infra Section I.B.
40. See infra Section II.C.
41. See infra Section II.B.
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of the private market and those affected by securities fraud, while carefully avoiding chilling the flow of funding for innovation and new business.
Increasing public enforcement presents such a solution. It is not sensitive to the
issues that impede private class actions in this context such as opaque stock pricing, judgment-proof defendants, and the difficulty of aggregating plaintiffs who
might be differently situated and lack standing or incentive to bring suit.
Moreover, public enforcement can help to fill the oversight gap that venture capitalists and other private investors might leave unfulfilled and can be calibrated
over time and with further study.
Finally, the Article explores two additional responses to securities fraud in the
private market—one bold and one unconventional—both reinforcing the argument for increasing public enforcement and presenting opportunity for future regulatory change. First, the Article contributes to a growing literature that imagines
redrawing the public–private line to better capture the public footprint of large
corporations and possible gradations or tiers of publicness.42 To date, this literature has focused primarily on the need for the sunlight of public disclosure for
large private corporations—by contrast, this Article highlights that securities
fraud enforcement is another important consideration for redrawing the public–
private line, as it represents another key mechanism for protecting investors and
the general public. Second, this Article highlights that the response to securities
fraud need not look the same in the private as in the public market. Alternative
mechanisms to increase accountability, such as giving startup employees additional information and empowering gatekeepers to play a stronger role in monitoring, could provide finely tuned responses to information problems that could
supplement increased public enforcement.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces Rule 10b–5 from its origins to its
evolution with the drawing of the public–private line between corporations and
the emergence of the “fraud-on-the-market” class action. These developments
gave rise to modern Rule 10b–5 litigation in which securities fraud is enforced by
class actions aimed at public company defendants. Part II describes the growth of
the private capital market, including discussion of both primary issuances and
secondary trading. Further, Part II examines governance and cultural dynamics
that give rise to factors that are characteristic of securities fraud and analyzes the
obstacles to Rule 10b–5 class actions in private markets. Together, the picture
that emerges is a large private capital market in which there is significant potential for securities fraud, but there is less scrutiny and enforcement than in the public counterpart. Part III explores a variety of responses that provide a foundation
for the future of policing securities fraud in private markets.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 10B–5 IN A PUBLIC MARKET PARADIGM
Although the federal securities fraud prohibition broadly applies to both public
and private companies, litigation and enforcement regarding the former has
42. See infra Section III.C.
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predominated. The story of Rule 10b–5 has been told many times, but the distinctly public lens through which the jurisprudence and practice has developed
has not been the focus of the tale. Over time, securities fraud jurisprudence and
academic debate has become increasingly robust as the paucity of attention to private markets has grown more glaring.
This Part demonstrates the public company focus through which Rule 10b–5
jurisprudence and practice has evolved, growing into the modern landscape in
which companies in the public capital market are subject to active scrutiny,
whereas those in the private capital market are often left in the shadows of
enforcement.
A. ORIGINS

The Great Crash of 1929 set in motion the adoption of the federal securities
laws that remain our foundational regulatory framework today. By 1934, the time
of the Securities Exchange Act’s passage, there was “widespread consensus that
excessive stock market speculation and the collapse of the stock market had
brought down the economy.”43 The securities acts that Congress passed in the
Great Depression that followed “were primarily concerned with preventing a recurrence.”44 Together, the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) put in place a system of mandatory public disclosure and sanctions for disclosure violations and fraud.45
First, after a series of hearings that revealed shocking financial abuses,46
Congress passed the 1933 Act “to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect
investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing.”47 The 1933 Act replaced the existing caveat emptor philosophy with
one of issuer disclosure.48 Further, the 1933 Act included Section 17(a), prohibiting fraud and misrepresentations in the offer or sale of securities.49
43. Thel, supra note 28, at 409.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 46, 57–59; Velikonja, supra note 19, at 1897 (“Modern
American securities regulation has two prongs: regulation of securities markets and the securities
industry; and regulation of corporate issuers, including mandatory disclosure, the prohibition of fraud,
and, more recently, corporate governance.”).
46. See, e.g., Thel, supra note 28, at 394–424 (discussing the historical background of the 1934 Act);
cf. 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 44–45 (describing the economic losses in 1929–1934). See generally
MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF
THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2010) (discussing how the Pecora hearings
brought to light a freewheeling banking industry in which officials had sold worthless bonds,
manipulated stock prices, and garnered excessive compensation and bonuses).
47. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
48. Thel, supra note 28, at 409. For a discussion of the purposes served by accurate stock prices, see
generally Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE
L.J. 977 (1992).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2018). Section 17(a) is similar in many respects to Rule 10b–5 but is broader in
that claims under Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) may be based on negligent conduct, and narrower in that it
does not reach the “purchase” of securities or allow for private rights of action. See, e.g., Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568–71 (1979); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998)
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Second, in light of the apparent need for additional regulation beyond primary
securities offerings from issuers, Congress passed the 1934 Act, which provides
for periodic reporting requirements and a broad catchall prohibition against
securities fraud in Section 10(b).50 This provision makes it unlawful “[t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” that contravenes any rule promulgated
by the SEC.51 As others have observed, “[t]he mandatory corporate disclosure
system was adopted because of widely held beliefs that securities fraud was prevalent and that state laws often could do little to prevent or punish it.”52 Section
10(b) closed a loophole in the SEC’s fraud enforcement authority by allowing the
agency to pursue fraud committed in connection with the purchase as well as the
sale of securities.53
In an oft-recounted anecdote, a staff attorney described how Rule 10b–5,
which implemented Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, was created in 1943 in
response to a specific incident of fraud—an executive was buying up stock in
his own company by telling shareholders that the company was doing badly,
all while knowing that earnings would in fact quadruple in the coming year.54
Upon learning of this incident, the staff attorney and an SEC director
promptly drafted a rule, combining language from Section 17 of the 1933 Act
and the congressional grant of authority from Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.55
In relevant part, Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful for any person “to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of
(explaining that Section 17 actions can be brought in civil regulatory actions by the SEC and criminal
prosecutions by the DOJ, but not by plaintiffs in private lawsuits); Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d
169, 174–75 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing difference between Section 17 and Rule 10b–5); SEC v. Tex.
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (noting that Section 10(b) was intended as
a broad “catchall[]” enforcement provision aimed at both buyers and sellers of securities).
50. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 859 (“Indeed, from its very inception, Section 10(b), and
the proposed sections in H.R. 1383 and S. 3420 from which it was derived, have always been
acknowledged as catchalls.”); 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 58 (explaining that the 1934 Act aimed to
provide “a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities” and to “prevent and afford
remedies for fraud in securities trading”).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
52. 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 289–90 (4th ed.
2006); see id. at 298 (“By the end of the 1917–1920 securities fraud wave, it was obvious that state blue
sky enforcement alone could have only limited success in staunching securities fraud, primarily because
no state’s law could reach by direct action or extradition a seller of fraudulent securities residing in a
second state.”).
53. Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison D’Eˆtre of the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 39, 40 (Sean Griffith et al. eds.,
2018) (citing Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804, 3804 (May 21, 1942)).
54. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, Address Before the Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, in 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)).
55. See id.
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any security.”56 As the telling goes, upon receiving the draft language, the commissioners passed it around the table and immediately approved it without controversy.57 The only comment made was by Commissioner Sumner Pike who
said, “Well . . . we are against fraud, aren’t we?”58
Shortly after the SEC adopted Rule 10b–5, federal courts recognized a private
right to sue for securities fraud,59 and as consensus was forming, the Supreme
Court affirmed this implied right.60 Early cases brought under Rule 10b–5
resembled common law fraud claims with respect to the elements and factual
allegations.61 Plaintiffs were required to prove actual reliance on a defendant’s
misrepresentations, and typical cases involved face-to-face dealings and privity
of contract.62
B. EVOLUTION

By the 1960s, two developments began to take root that would ultimately shape
our modern landscape: the drawing of the public–private line between corporations and the emergence of the fraud-on-the-market class action that pervades
modern Rule 10b–5 litigation. These regulatory and doctrinal developments converged to create a world in which securities fraud litigation is enforced by private
class actions aimed at public company defendants.
Regarding the first development, both Securities Acts reflect a public–private
divide, taking different approaches but together creating a public realm.63 The
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2020). The Supreme Court has established a private cause of action under
Rule 10b–5 to require “(1) ‘a material misrepresentation (or omission)’; (2) ‘scienter, i.e., a wrongful
state of mind’; (3) ‘a connection with the purchase or sale of a security’; (4) ‘reliance’; (5) ‘economic
loss’; and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the
loss.’” Buell, supra note 26, at 545 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)).
57. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 767 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing a
private right of action under Rule 10b–5).
60. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001) (discussing evolution of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on implied private rights of action in other contexts); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971) (citing Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827
(1970)) (affirming federal district court in recognizing private right of action under Rule 10b–5); Rose,
supra note 53 (discussing the development of the private right of action under Rule 10b–5 and the
consensus developed by the federal courts leading up to Supreme Court recognition).
61. Rose, supra note 53, at 40–41.
62. See, e.g., 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, SECURITIES
FRAUD: MISREPRESENTATIONS AND NONDISCLOSURES § 4.2 (2d ed. 2019) (“The archetypal 10b-5 case is
the purchase by one group in a closed corporation of the interest of another. . . .”); Donald C.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-Party
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2149 (2010) (noting that before the Second
Circuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur decision in 1968, “private securities fraud litigation had arisen mainly in
face-to-face dealings, with fraud by a purchaser or seller of securities and with the victims as the
counterparties in the transaction”); Rose, supra note 53, at 40–41 (noting that in the early years of
securities fraud jurisprudence “there was little difference between Rule 10b-5 and common law fraud
claims”).
63. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339–40 (2013) (noting the “gross
inconsistency” in how the securities acts approach the public–private divide); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting
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1933 Act governs “public offering[s],” but does not define the term.64 An early
SEC release provided guidance for what qualified as exempt transactions, noting
as relevant factors a small offering size and close relationship between the issuer
and offerees.65 In 1953, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., ruling that offerees who could “fend for themselves” did not
need the protections of the Act.66 This interpretation focused the 1933 Act’s
public–private line on notions of qualification for private investments based on
investor wealth and sophistication.67
By contrast, the 1934 Act tied the periodic public-disclosure obligations to voluntarily listing on a national securities exchange68 and was amended in 1964 to
add Section 12(g), which set a threshold for public status based on features of the
issuer company—assets and number of shareholders of record.69 The effect of
Section 12(g) was to bring over-the-counter securities trading, with “sufficiently
active trading markets and public interest,” within the purview of the SEC’s
public-disclosure regime.70 Thus, by the 1960s there were three triggers for public
status: making a “public offering,” listing on a national securities exchange, and
reaching the Section 12(g) threshold. As Donald Langevoort and Robert
Thompson have observed: “For a time, at least, the 1964 amendments created a
strong bias in favor of public status, precisely given the practical needs of most

“Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good,
36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000–01 (2013) (noting a “mismatch” between the 1933 Act’s focus on
investor protection through the registration model and the 1934 Act’s approach, which reflects a
compromise between investor protection and capital formation).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2018) (stating the Section 5 registration requirement shall not apply to
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63,
at 343 & n.14 (noting that the 1933 Act exempts transactions not involving public offerings, transactions
made intrastate, and small dollar offerings).
65. See Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to Be Considered in Determining the
Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1),
Securities Act Release No. 33-285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) (noting number of offerees and their
relationship to each other and the issuer, size of the offering, and manner of offering as relevant factors).
66. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
67. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 340; see also C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated
Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1083–85 (examining treatment of
investor sophistication).
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (2018); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 344.
69. See Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 715; see also 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 52, at 307 (“Elaborate studies of the
omission of material investment information by firms not subject to the mandatory disclosure system
were made by the SEC between 1946 and 1963 as part of the Commission’s ultimately successful effort
to persuade Congress to extend the continuous disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to
all firms above a minimum size.”); Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and
Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 168
(2013) (discussing congressional debate of the 1964 amendments); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note
63, at 345 (noting the lack of theoretical consensus on how to define publicness for purposes of Section
12(g) at the time of adoption).
70. Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23407, 1986 WL 703825, at *2 (July
8, 1986); see also Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1529, 1534 (2015) (discussing the origins of Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act).
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growing businesses for both capital and liquidity.”71
The second development that began during this period was a doctrinal shift to
“unmoor the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action from its common law roots.”72
As a result of a series of rulings, the fraud-on-the-market class action emerged
and became the dominant force of modern securities fraud litigation.
An early step on this path was the abandonment of privity as a requirement for
liability. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit held that a defendant need not be a counterparty or a contemporaneous trader to violate Section
10(b) or Rule 10b–5.73 The requirement that the fraud be “in connection with the
purchase or sale of [a] security”74 was fulfilled by victims who were purchasers
or sellers, whereas the violator could be anyone who made a material misrepresentation or omission in a manner “reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.”75 Subsequently, investors began filing actions that became known as
fraud-on-the-market cases, claiming the marketplace had been deceived by false
representations.76 Furthermore, 1966 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure enabled plaintiffs to aggregate claims in a class action under Rule
23(b)(3), provided that common issues predominated over individualized ones.77
The next important doctrinal development was the Supreme Court’s recognition in Basic Inc. v. Levinson of a presumption of reliance in private Rule 10b–5
cases involving securities widely traded in “efficient” markets.78 Plaintiffs are
entitled to this rebuttable presumption of reliance if they show that the alleged
misrepresentation was material and public, the stock traded in an efficient market,
and their trading occurred between the time the misrepresentation was made and

71. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 346.
72. Rose, supra note 53, at 44.
73. 401 F.2d 833, 860–61 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (“Congress intended to protect the investing
public . . . [from] misleading statements promulgated for or on behalf of corporations irrespective of
whether the insiders contemporaneously trade . . . [or] the corporation or its management have an
ulterior purpose or purposes in making an official public release.”).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2020).
75. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 862; see id. at 857–62 (discussing the SEC’s argument that,
after newspaper reports of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s discovery of mineral deposits, the “corporate
defendant” violated 10b–5 by issuing a press release that denied the reports and “painted a misleading
and deceptive picture of the drilling progress at the time of its issuance”).
76. Langevoort, supra note 62.
77. Rose, supra note 53, at 45.
78. 485 U.S. 224, 227–28, 250 (1988) (affirming a presumption of reliance existed in a class action of
former Basic shareholders who sold stock after the corporation’s first public denial of merger activity
but before the suspension of its stock trading just prior to merger announcement); see Donald C.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 158–62. Prior to
this decision, the Supreme Court had dispensed with the requirement of reliance in material omission
cases under the efficient market theory. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 152 (1972). For a critical examination of the weaknesses of the efficient market theory, see
generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (casting “doubt on the wisdom of reliance on the
efficient market hypothesis”); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003) (discussing the weaknesses of the efficient market
theory).
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when the truth was revealed.79 The fraud-on-the-market theory was based on the
efficient capital market hypothesis, which maintained that “the market price of
shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”80 Thus, Basic freed public
company shareholders from showing that they actually relied on the alleged misrepresentation. Instead, such plaintiffs have a presumption that they relied on the
integrity of the stock’s market price.81
Together, the abandonment of the privity requirement and the acceptance of
the fraud-on-the-market theory transformed Rule 10b–5 litigation. Corporations
that had not bought or sold stock could be defendants, despite being neither a
counterparty nor contemporaneous trader. Eliminating the requirement to prove
individualized reliance expanded the universe of potential plaintiffs and facilitated class actions.82 These class actions grew to predominate securities fraud litigation and dramatically departed from earlier case law and traditional common
law fraud cases.83 With the availability of compensatory damages in Rule 10b–5
class actions––which allow plaintiffs to recover their full out-of-pocket losses attributable to the fraud—attorneys have a strong incentive to bring these suits
against public company defendants.84
Indeed, Rule 10b–5 as a tool against securities fraud has been undeniably
shaped by the public company paradigm that envisions class action attorneys
serving as private monitors of public disclosures affecting stock prices on an
79. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–47.
80. Id. at 246. Economists developed the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) in the mid1960s as a way to explain several empirical studies that found that future changes in stock prices were a
“random walk” that could not be accurately predicted based on prior prices. The ECMH “explains” the
random walk by hypothesizing that prices change in response to information about a particular
company’s stock. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 551–66 (1994)
(summarizing the history of the ECMH and the random walk model of public capital market behavior);
see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 609 (1984) (observing “relative efficiency is a function of information costs”). See generally
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970) (reviewing economics literature on the ECMH).
81. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47.
82. See Rose, supra note 53, at 45–46 (noting that modern fraud-on-the-market class actions not only
involve an “expanded set of plaintiffs and defendants, an altered set of elements, and the aggregation of
claims” but also “involve defendants with different motives, raise different stakes, and create different
incentives to sue and settle than existed in the early years of private Rule 10b-5 enforcement”).
83. See id. at 45.
84. Securities fraud class actions against public companies exploded by the 1990s, prompting
regulation attempting to recalibrate the level of private litigation. See Buell, supra note 26, at 550
(“Seeking to reduce the expenses arising out of weak or meritless cases, Congress updated the ’34 Act
with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Under the PSLRA, private
plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened pleading standard with respect to the element of scienter.” (footnote
omitted)); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 927–28 (1999) (noting that “the damages recoverable
in such suits can be a substantial percentage of the corporation’s total capitalization, reaching the tens or
even hundreds of millions of dollars” and that corporations’ complaints about their prevalence led to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
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efficient market.85 From the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to
“materiality” defined in terms of a “reasonable investor,” the elements of a Rule
10b–5 suit reflect the prevalence of public company cases.86
And although courts certainly have not required the markers of the public company paradigm for a securities fraud action,87 the availability of stock price movements on a public market facilitates discovery of suits, and the prospect of large
compensatory damages incentivizes such monitoring.88 In 2019, 382 of the 428
securities class actions involved public companies with stock traded on the New
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.89 Securities class actions are trending toward
larger company defendants—companies involved in cases that settled in 2019
were fifty-nine percent larger than those in the previous year, as measured by total
assets—and the median settlement amount was thirty-four percent higher than
the nine-year median.90 As the next Part explains, although these settlement
amounts and corporate defendants are large, the doctrinal evolution of securities
litigation toward a public company model significantly narrows the realm of capital markets being actively monitored once one takes into account the rise of the
private capital market.

85. See Buell, supra note 26, at 550 (“[T]he class action dominates the modern industry of private
securities litigation . . . .”).
86. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (discussing “materiality”); No.
84 Emp’r–Teamster Joint Council Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 949–50
(9th Cir. 2003) (stating that when a public company corrects an alleged omission or misrepresentation,
the stock price movement or lack of movement is “at least telling of what a reasonable investor would
consider significant”); In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 621, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting
that, in an efficient market, the “total mix of information” is understood as the information available to
the public market); see also DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS,
SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that courts
have allowed the market itself to stand in for the reasonable investor when securities are traded in an
“efficient” market).
87. On the government side, the SEC and DOJ also play a critical role in enforcement and can pursue
the full spectrum of public and private companies. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (noting that private actions are an “essential supplement to criminal prosecutions
and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and
Exchange Commission”); James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 145–62 (2012) (discussing securities fraud enforcement by the
SEC, federal prosecutors, state attorneys general, and private class action attorneys).
88. Notably, plaintiffs’ attorneys not only use stock price drops as a mechanism for detecting
potential class action suits but also for proving the element of loss causation. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (finding that loss causation can be established by showing that public
disclosure of a fact was followed by a stock price decline); see also Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of
Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 548 (2012) (observing that “for public firms, share-price
drops can trigger class-action lawsuits alleging that glowing public disclosures released prior to a
collapse were fraudulent”).
89. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2019 YEAR IN REVIEW 1, 49
(2020), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2019-Yearin-Review [https://perma.cc/JQF3-DFXN].
90. See LAARNI T. BULAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2019 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2–3 (2020), https://www.cornerstone.com/
Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2019-Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.
cc/BZ2W-X5EC].
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II. THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE MARKETS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE COMPANY
LIES
The era of one dominant capital market in the United States is over.91 The public capital market remains profoundly important to the economy, but it now sits
in tension with a rising private capital market that is “both unrivaled and coveted
around the globe” for “substantially contribut[ing] to the competitiveness of U.S.
firms.”92
Research indicates that private equity and venture capital investments have
grown at twice the rate of their public counterparts in recent years.93 Venturebacked startups are staying private longer on average and reaching recordbreaking private valuations in the billions of dollars, rivaling or surpassing
public-industrial giants in some cases.94 Private market growth has been notably strong—“[g]lobal private equity (PE) net asset value grew by 18 percent in
2018,” and overall “it has grown by 7.5 times” in the twenty-first century,
“twice as fast as public market capitalization.”95
The rising private capital market not only delivers growth and innovation,
however—it also poses new challenges and concerns that policymakers, academics, and market participants have only begun to address. For its part, the SEC has
announced twin goals of making public capital markets more attractive while
also expanding retail investors’ access to private investments.96 This policy
91. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New
Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 340–53 (2008) (describing “the global proliferation
of viable private and public markets, the trend of investment intermediation and deretailization, and the
accelerated pace of financial innovation”); Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns,
Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 716–27 (2017)
(discussing the rise of the private equity market and the relative decline of the IPO market).
92. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Economic Club of New
York (Sept. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Clayton, 2019 Remarks], (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speech-clayton-2019-09-09 [https://perma.cc/Z37B-QJRG]).
93. See id.; see also MCKINSEY & CO., MCKINSEY’S PRIVATE MARKETS ANNUAL REVIEW 4 (2019),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights/mckinseysprivate-markets-annual-review [https://perma.cc/QF74-GYRB] (noting that $778 billion of new
capital flowed into the private capital market in 2018).
94. See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2019 YEARBOOK 5, 32 (2019), https://nvca.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/NVCA-2019-Yearbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S3K-9CXW]; Clayton, 2019
Remarks, supra note 92. See generally Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Median Age of IPOs
Through 2019 (Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished tabular data) (available at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/
ritter/files/2020/02/IPOs2019Age.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2MA-Q7TH]) (providing year-by-year documentation
of the median age and proceeds for VC-backed and technology IPOs). For a discussion of venture-backed
company valuations, see generally Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with
Reality, 135 J. FIN. ECON. 120 (2019).
95. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 93. The economic downturn spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic
has impacted the private market, but private equity and venture capital have proven resilient to date. See
HUGH MACARTHUR, BAIN & CO., PRIVATE EQUITY TAKES A MIDYEAR BOUNCE OFF THE BOTTOM 1–2
(2020), https://www.bain.com/insights/private-equity-takes-a-midyear-bounce-off-the-bottom/ [https://
perma.cc/3S3H-GPK9]; PITCHBOOK, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, SILICON VALLEY BANK &
CERTENT, VENTURE MONITOR: Q2 2020, at 3, 11 (2020), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/q2-2020pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor (complete form and download report).
96. Clayton, 2019 Remarks, supra note 92.
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stance reflects the bind that the agency finds itself in—troubled by declining numbers of public companies trading on national securities exchanges, yet also cognizant that “Main Street” investors may be shut out of the private capital market
where much of the growth phase of companies’ development is occurring.97 As
the SEC has prioritized opening up access to the private capital market and harmonizing securities offering exemptions, little debate has focused on the potential
for harm through securities fraud in this increasingly large section of the overall
capital markets.98
Notably, the universe of private companies is wide and encompasses closely
held corporations such as the paradigmatic family business, private equitybacked companies in which a small number of institutional investors are actively
involved in management, and venture capital-backed startups aimed at high
growth and exit.99 Although securities fraud can occur in all of these types of private companies, the latter category poses particular concern as venture capital
has soared to record levels while operating on a business model known to push
for growth at all costs, aiming for a few homeruns and writing off failures.100
This Part examines the rise and growth of the private capital market, highlighting the changes that have occurred that have enabled this development and the
features of this market and its participants. Subsequently, this Part gives special
attention to exploring the information asymmetries, pressure for growth, and freewheeling culture in venture-backed startups that give rise to the potential for
securities fraud that could significantly impact investors and stakeholders.

97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving
Access to Capital in Private Markets, Securities Act Release No. 33-10844, at 268 (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/33-10844.pdf [https://perma.cc/F48U-HXQV] (“The amendments
may increase aggregate potential investor losses [and] [i]ncreased offering limits under Regulation A
Tier 2, Regulation Crowdfunding, and Rule 504 may make it easier for smaller, higher-risk issuers to
access capital through these exemptions.” (footnote omitted)); Caroline A. Crenshaw, Comm’r,
Statement on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/crenshaw-harmonization-2020-11-02 [https://perma.cc/2T5B-JGQ9] (“Today’s
rule significantly expands private market access to investors without first putting in place appropriate
investor protections. . . . The solutions this rule presents are to allow private companies to raise capital
by selling more risky offerings, in greater dollar amounts, with less information, and fewer rights to
unprepared and unprotected investors.”); Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, Statement on Amendments to
the Exempt Offering Framework (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/leeharmonization-2020-11-02 [https://perma.cc/3FGW-537F] (“In recent years . . . the exception (or
exemptions from registration) have swallowed the rule, with statutory and regulatory changes steadily
chipping away at restrictions on private offerings and exposing more and more retail investors to their
risks.”).
99. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 163–65 (2019).
100. See Erin Griffith, The Ugly Unethical Underside of Silicon Valley, FORTUNE, Jan. 2017, at
72, 75, https://fortune.com/longform/silicon-valley-startups-fraud-venture-capital/ (“Faking it, from
marketing exaggerations to outright fraud, feels more prevalent than ever—so much so that it’s time
to ask whether startup culture itself is becoming a problem.”); see also 16 of the Biggest Alleged
Startup Frauds of All Time, CB INSIGHTS (May 23, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/
biggest-startup-frauds (“There’s almost always an element of ‘fake it ’till you make it’ for a
successful, disruptive startup. Some companies just push their luck a little too far.”).
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Finally, it examines the obstacles for traditional securities class actions to play a
monitoring role in the private capital market.
A. THE NEW PRIVATE LANDSCAPE

In a recent speech, SEC Chair Jay Clayton acknowledged: “We now have
two segments in our capital markets. . . . Twenty five years ago, the public
markets dominated the private markets in virtually every measure. Today, in
many measures, the private markets outpace the public markets, including in
aggregate size.”101 The SEC’s analysis estimates that registered public offerings accounted for $1.4 trillion of new capital in 2018 compared to approximately $2.9 trillion raised through exempt private offerings.102 Public
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges have declined in number by nearly
half in the past two decades, and they are significantly larger on average.103
These figures reflect the dramatic transformation of U.S. markets in the
twenty-first century.
Venture-backed startups constitute a large portion of the private capital market
and their life cycle has changed significantly. The venture capital (VC) life cycle
starts with the creation of funds that raise capital from institutional and accredited
investors interested in private-growth assets.104 The VC deploys the funds into a
portfolio of startup companies,105 typically also playing a role in governance or
otherwise supporting these innovative companies.106 Venture capital funds have a
defined term of ten years and detailed rules about how limited partner investors
can liquidate their assets at the end of that period.107 The goal is for the startup
companies in the portfolio to grow quickly and achieve successful “exits” during
101. Clayton, 2019 Remarks, supra note 92.
102. Id. at n.9 (citing a 2018 analysis by the SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis).
103. See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 455 (2017) (“From 2001 through 2012, there were an average
of only 99 IPOs per year, compared to 310 IPOs per year between 1980 and 2000.”); Craig Doidge, G.
Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 467 (2017) (discussing
how the number of U.S. listings fell from 8,025 in 1996 to 4,102 in 2012); Brian R. Cheffins, Rumours of
the Death of the American Public Company Are Greatly Exaggerated 23 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 444, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3225889 [https://perma.cc/T2GA-N8F6] (observing that the number of U.S. public companies has
declined and “those companies which are publicly traded are now considerably bigger”); Kathleen M.
Kahle & René M. Stulz, Is the U.S. Public Corporation in Trouble? 2 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 495, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2869301 [https://perma.cc/D8NL-EBSV] (“The steady decrease in the number of listed firms since
1997 has resulted from both low numbers of newly listed firms and high numbers of delists. . . .
[T]he average yearly number of IPOs after 2000 is roughly one-third of the average from 1980 to
2000.”).
104. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 6–8 (2d ed. 2004);
Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003).
105. See Gilson, supra note 104, at 1071; Pollman, supra note 99, at 170, 172.
106. See Pollman, supra note 99, at 173.
107. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 256 (1998); Gilson, supra note 104, at 1070–76
(explaining the standard limited partnership agreement).
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this period through a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) sale or IPO that makes a
significant return on investment.108 Although M&A exits are more common,
industry experts and academics have long viewed IPOs as essential for sustaining
a robust venture capital industry because they provide a mechanism for obtaining
high investor returns and liquidity.109 Venture capital is based on a business model
that aims to have a few “home runs” that account for much of the fund returns.110
In previous times, a startup company that survived to exit would typically be
acquired or go public within about five years.111 Companies raised capital from
public markets to fuel growth and access liquidity for VC investors and startup
employees who had received stock options.112 Several of the world’s largest companies by market capitalization—Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, and Google—
followed this exit path as venture-backed startups.113
But with regulatory changes and an unprecedented influx of private capital,
companies have increasingly stayed longer in the private market and tend to go to
the public markets only when governance complexity builds over a period and
private investors are ready to cash out.114 One of the most notable regulatory
changes facilitating staying private longer was the JOBS Act of 2012, in which
Congress raised the Section 12(g) threshold of the 1934 Act from 500 to 2,000
108. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 317 (2005).
109. See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 107, at 245 (arguing that “a well developed stock market
that permits venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is critical to the existence
of a vibrant venture capital market”); Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 11 (“IPOs are the gold standard in VC
success.”).
110. See PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 86–87
(2014) (“[T]he best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund
combined.” (italics omitted)); Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec.
1998, at 131, 136 (“Given the portfolio approach and the deal structure VCs use, however, only 10% to
20% of the companies funded need to be real winners to achieve the targeted return rate. . . . In fact, VC
reputations are often built on one or two good investments.”).
111. See Ritter, supra note 94, at tbl.4 (tracking the median age of venture-backed companies at IPO
from five years in 1999 to ten years by 2019); It’s Definitely a Marathon – Venture-Backed Tech IPOs
Take Seven Years From First Financing, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.cbinsights.com/
research/venture-capital-exit-timeframe-tech (noting that the average time from the first funding round
to exit via M&A in 2007 was over five years).
112. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 108, at 352 (“The primary justification for an IPO is to raise money,
usually in anticipation of a substantial expansion in the company’s operations, but the IPO has many
ancillary benefits. In addition, to the obvious benefits that accompany the liquidity of public capital
markets, companies may find that publicly traded stock is useful in recruiting new managers and
acquiring other companies.”).
113. Pollman, supra note 99, at 156; see Stephen Grocer, Biggest Public Company? Microsoft. Wait,
Apple Again. Amazon? No, Back to Microsoft., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/02/05/business/dealbook/apple-amazon-microsoft-market-value.html. Google, now organized
under parent company Alphabet, had been profitable pre-IPO and was able to finance its operations
while remaining private but hit up against the Section 12(g) threshold and thus decided to file for an IPO.
Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1536–37; Grocer, supra.
114. See Pollman, supra note 99, at 209–16; see also Matt Levine, Something Is Lost when
Companies Stay Private, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-04-04/something-is-lost-when-companies-stay-private (“Private markets are the new
public markets. That’s a thing that I say a lot. . . . You stay private to raise money and build your
business and grow; you go public to allow your investors to cash out.”).
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shareholders of record, of which no more than 499 can be unaccredited investors.115 Employee stock option holders and shareholders are not counted in this
tally.116 In 2018, the SEC also raised the Rule 701 threshold to require financial
disclosures to stock option holders only once a company grants more than $10
million in options during a twelve-month period.117
The upshot of these changes is that significant amounts of capital are tied up
for long periods in essentially illiquid or semi-illiquid markets with little transparency. The average time to M&A and IPO exits have doubled since the late 1990s,
and as noted, fewer companies have gone public.118 Going public has become a
choice rather than an inevitability even for large corporations as the Section 12(g)
threshold no longer “forces” any companies over the line.119 The 2,000 holdersof-record limit is sufficiently high such that a shareholder base can be managed to
stay below it—particularly as “special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) and other planning tools are used to aggregate holdings.120
Companies tend to be larger when they enter the public market, with more of
their growth trajectory occurring as private companies. With record-breaking
amounts of private capital available, and a competitive market to invest in the

115. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 501, § 12(g)(1)(A),
126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2018)). In 2020, the
SEC adopted amendments to the definition of “accredited investor,” adding new categories of
qualifying persons and entities. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Modernizes the
Accredited Investor Definition (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-191
[https://perma.cc/2R58-2YCC].
116. JOBS Act of 2012 sec. 502. For a discussion of agency capture and public choice theory with
regard to the JOBS Act, see Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market,
91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 786–96 (2013) and Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1552–54.
117. Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 3310520, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,940, 34,941 (July 18, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/2018/33-10520.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9NR-8WSK]. Additionally, the SEC shortened
the Rule 144 holding period to allow resales of private company stock after one year with no conditions
and exempted Rule 506 private placements with accredited investors from the ban on general
solicitation. See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 175–
76 (2017) (discussing amendments to Rules 144 and 506).
118. See Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that the average time two decades ago for venture
capital-backed companies to exit was three to four years); Ritter, supra note 94, at tbl.4 (charting the
declining number of IPOs).
119. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 43, 43 (2011) (explaining that the practical effect of the previous threshold was “to force
certain types of firms into the public markets”); cf. Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1530 (finding that the
previous threshold of 500 shareholders of record may have affected only about three percent of
companies going public).
120. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 355–59 (discussing the “record ownership” and
the SEC’s anticircumvention rule, Rule 12g5-1, in the private company context); cf. Alistair Barr, One
Theory Why Lyft, Uber IPOs Flopped: Special Purpose Vehicles, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/one-theory-why-lyft-uber-ipos-floppedspecial-purpose-vehicles (“SPVs are often set up to invest in fast-growing startups, especially those
like Uber that stay private for many years.”); Douglas MacMillan, In Silicon Valley Frenzy, VCs
Create New Inside Track, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/insilicon-valley-frenzy-vcs-create-new-inside-track-1427992176 (discussing the increasing use of
special purpose vehicles to invest in venture-backed startups).
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most buzzworthy startups, private valuations have been high—leading to speculation of a tech bubble and overpriced IPOs.121
A greater diversity of investors has also entered the private markets.
Whereas in the past, startups were typically funded by family and friends,
angel investors, and venture capitalists, in recent years these investors have
been joined by family offices, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and
sovereign wealth funds.122 These newcomers expose retail investors to the
private markets, and as institutional investors, they are sophisticated but do
not have long track records of investing in this asset class, the special challenges they pose, and their distinctive style of governance and contracting
practices.
These developments have affected both primary issuances and secondary trading of private company stock.123 At the core, companies staying private longer
and reaching higher valuations means that there is a greater volume of transactions and dollars invested,124 and correspondingly more opportunity for securities
fraud. In addition, the greater diversity of investors in late-stage rounds of financing has expanded the universe from the Silicon Valley community of VCs that
are repeat players in a reputational market to a global mix of institutional investors that resembles public markets in some respects. The enormous amount of private capital seeking to invest in the best deals, combined with new investors in
the space, has created leverage for companies to choose which investors to accept
and to limit disclosures—adding to information asymmetries which can also enable securities fraud.
Primary issuances to investors occur through private placements relying on an
exemption from registration—typically Regulation D in connection with offers
of securities to “accredited investors” or Section 4(a)(2) which exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering” as interpreted by the

121. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 120, 135, 136 tbl.7 (finding that after adjusting for
valuation-inflating terms in preferred stock financings, almost half of “unicorns” lose their status as
billion-plus valued companies); Matt Phillips, Stephen Grocer & Erin Griffith, Wall Street Deflates
America’s Favorite Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/
business/tech-ipo-market.html (discussing fear of a bubble and that “the verdict from the stock market is
that it’s the private investment binge that has gone too far”); David Trainer, The Unicorn Bubble Is
Bursting, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2019, 9:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/07/
the-unicorn-bubble-is-bursting/#e3f34f388198 (“There does not appear to be any appreciation for risk
of bidding up the price of unicorns too high.”).
122. See, e.g., Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 121; Pollman, supra note 99, at 175; Sergey
Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23981, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w23981.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA4Q-5ART].
123. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64
UCLA L. REV. 116, 144–45 (2017) (“After a security has been distributed to the public, it trades in a
secondary market. Such transactions involve trading between investors rather than a sale from the issuer
to an investor.”); Pollman, supra note 29, at 183–202 (discussing secondary trading in private company
stock).
124. For example, a notable recent study of 135 unicorn companies found that the average unicorn has
eight share classes, indicating many rounds of financings. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 121.
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Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.125 There are no specific disclosure requirements for private placements under Section 4(a)(2) or Regulation
D offerings to accredited investors,126 creating the possibility of negotiations
for limited disclosures and extreme divergences in the information known
about the company.
Employees are typically not financially sophisticated and do not qualify as
accredited investors who would be permitted to participate in a private placement of their employers’ securities. Rule 701 exempts grants of share-based
compensation to employees.127 Most companies will satisfy the minimal disclosure requirement of Rule 701 by merely providing the employee recipients
with a copy of the relevant stock option plan.128 Companies that issue more
than $10 million worth of securities under the exemption in a twelve-month
period are required to provide a summary of the material terms of the compensatory plan, a list of risk factors associated with investing in the company’s securities, and financial statements.129 Scholars have criticized these
disclosure requirements as inadequate and poorly tailored to employees’
needs, particularly in unicorn companies that have reached sizeable valuations and may have large numbers of employees with little access to
information.130
Although the changing private market landscape has impacted primary issuances, the bigger transformation has been the rise of secondary trading in private
company stock.131 A decade ago, the private secondary market had been notably
illiquid and ad hoc, with occasional transfers done as carefully negotiated

125. See 346 U.S. 119, 120, 125 (1953) (holding that application of the exemption “should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the [Securities] Act”); id. (“An
offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any
~ , BUSINESS
public offering.’”); THERESE H. MAYNARD, DANA M. WARREN & SHANNON TREVINO
PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 218–23 (3d ed.
2018) (explaining private placements and accredited investor status); James C. Spindler, How Private Is
Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 311 (2009) (“The very essence of private
equity is exemption from the public securities laws: funds make investments in nonpublic portfolio
companies, and the funds themselves are typically structured as limited partnerships.”).
126. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2020).
127. Id. § 230.701(c).
128. See id. § 230.701(e); Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan
Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 182 (2019).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(e).
130. See, e.g., Alon-Beck, supra note 128, at 182–83; Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Startup Employees, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 867, 870–72 (2019); Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold?
Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 616 (2017); Jennifer S. Fan,
Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 585, 604–05
(2016).
131. See Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 3; Pollman, supra note 29, at 181–82. Earlier periods noted a lack
of secondary trading in private company stock as a limiting factor on securities fraud litigation. See
Steinberg, supra note 29, at 762 (“The application of rule 10b-5 to close corporations, where lawsuits
typically relate less directly to the purchase or sale of a security, has been a major cause of uncertainty
over the rule’s scope. Because there is no secondary trading of [private company] securities, the rule
10b-5 close corporation lawsuit is more likely to contain corporate law issues.”).
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affairs.132 An opportunity arose for intermediaries to facilitate such trading, however, with two developments—internet-platform technology and rule changes
that eased resale restrictions. Specifically, in 2007, the SEC shortened the holding
period for the transfer of private company stock to one year with no conditions.133
The agency further provided a regulatory exemption for resales to “qualified
institutional buyers”—allowing unlimited transactions with no holding period.134 By 2009, two platforms, SecondMarket and SharesPost, launched as
online intermediaries, taking a small fee while reducing the search and transaction costs for secondary trading.135 With companies staying private longer and
using stock and stock options as incentive-based compensation, the possibility
for secondary trading to liquidate some stock ownership became increasingly
important to startup participants. Employees, former employees, angel investors, and VCs used these sites to identify accredited buyers willing to buy their
private company stock. The platforms were quickly doing large amounts of
transactions.136
In turn, many startups responded by putting in place contractual trading restrictions on their stock in order to manage their shareholder base and the valuation
and information issues that can arise with an active secondary trading market for
private company stock.137 The SecondMarket business model evolved to work
with companies to facilitate liquidity events such as share buybacks and thirdparty tender offers, rather than functioning as online auctions or bulletin boards
for connecting buyers and sellers.138 In 2014, Nasdaq launched a private market
initiative as a competitor and by the following year had acquired SecondMarket

132. See Pollman, supra note 29, at 203; Brad Stone, Silicon Valley Cashes Out Selling Private
Shares, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2011-04-21/silicon-valley-cashes-out-selling-private-shares.
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(2) (2020); Jones, supra note 117, at 175 (describing the SEC’s
series of reforms shortening the Rule 144 holding periods); Pollman, supra note 29, at 193 (noting that
“[t]he combination of the lengthened period of time companies stay private, securities law exemptions
for the resale of restricted stock, and information technology” created the opportunity for online
marketplaces for trading private shares).
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(b), (d)(1). Qualified institutional buyers are companies that in the
aggregate own and invest at least $100 million in securities of nonaffiliated issuers and registered broker–
dealers. Id. § 230.144A(a)(i).
135. Pollman, supra note 29, at 195–97, 199–201.
136. See Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:26 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/losing-the-goose-thatlaid-the-golden-egg (noting that in 2011 SharesPost facilitated $625 million in transactions and
SecondMarket almost $600 million, with pre-IPO Facebook stock constituting about a third of the
trading volume).
137. See Pollman, supra note 29, at 205–18 (discussing information issues in secondary trading of
private company stock and the potential for insider trading); cf. Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1539
(“Because these transactions took place not on a public exchange like the NYSE, but instead in a private
market limited to accredited investors, they could transpire outside the reach of the SEC’s 1999 rule on
OTC trading. No disclosure necessary.” (footnote omitted)).
138. See A Brief History of Secondary Stock Sales: From One-Offs to Employee Tender Offers,
FOUNDERS CIRCLE CAP., https://www.founderscircle.com/history-of-secondary-sale-shares [https://
perma.cc/P3K9-NMJE] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
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and repositioned itself as the private parallel to its public exchange counterpart.139
Nasdaq works with companies to facilitate “liquidity programs” that allow a company to impose guidelines, limitations, or restrictions around the sale of stock.140
The rest of the secondary market evolved as well. SharesPost continues to
function as an over-the-counter marketplace and has added an offering to invest
in late-stage, venture-backed companies through a proprietary, closed-end interval fund.141 Additional private company marketplaces have sprung up to compete, each with their own variations on facilitating private company secondary
deals and liquidity for private company employees.142
Finally, the level of secondary activity and complexity of the transactions are
noteworthy. The overall size of these secondary markets is significant and the
trend is increasing—over $4 billion in transaction volume was executed in 2017
by the four main players.143 In 2018, Nasdaq Private Market alone did $12 billion
in transaction volume and saw a significant increase in the number of third-party
tender offers.144 Moreover, the combinations of company buybacks, third-party
tender offers, and intermediated purchases, such as through SPVs, has grown and
resulted in new norms as well as different information flows and pricing.145 For
example, late-stage startups commonly plan a primary issuance in a financing
round to be timed with a secondary market liquidity program for selected

139. See Press Release, Nasdaq, NASDAQ Private Market Acquires SecondMarket (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://ir.nasdaq.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nasdaq-private-market-acquires-secondmarket
[https://perma.cc/HP5R-L4CQ]; Tess Stynes & Bradley Hope, Nasdaq Acquires SecondMarket,
Profit Rises 12%, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaqacquires-secondmarket-profit-rises-12-1445511644.
140. See NASDAQ PRIVATE MKT., SECONDARY MARKET 2019 RETROSPECTIVE 3, 5 (2020).
141. See FAQs, SHARESPOST, https://sharespost.com/marketplace/individual-investors/buyingprivate-assets/sharespost-100-fund/faqs [https://perma.cc/GVE9-7QF2] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
142. See DAVID F. LARCKER, BRIAN TAYAN & EDWARD WATTS, CASHING IT IN: PRIVATE-COMPANY
EXCHANGES AND EMPLOYEE STOCK SALES PRIOR TO IPO 1–2 (2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-73-private-company-exchanges.pdf [https://perma.
cc/F879-YEZC]; Miles Kruppa, Carta Plans Private Share Trading Platform to Rival Nasdaq, FIN.
TIMES (May 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/d52b0487-b13c-4bae-bf27-770518ff083d.
143. LARCKER ET AL., supra note 142, at 3.
144. See Press Release, Nasdaq Private Mkt., Secondary Market Performance 2018 Retrospective (Jan.
29, 2019), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/01/29/1706864/0/en/Nasdaq-Private-MarketFacilitates-a-Record-12-Billion-in-Transaction-Volume-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/R7S9-BDA6].
145. See DAWN BELT, FENWICK & WEST LLP, LEXIS PRACTICE ADVISOR PRACTICE NOTE: PRE-IPO
LIQUIDITY FOR LATE STAGE START-UPS 2–4 (2018), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/PreIPO-Liquidity-for-Late-Stage-Start-Up.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L7W-QVYM] (discussing secondary
sales, company buybacks, and information asymmetry considerations); LARCKER ET AL., supra note 142,
at 2 (describing the impact of private marketplaces on companies and employees); NASDAQ PRIVATE
MKT., supra 140, at 2–4 (describing the variety of secondary activity in private company stock and the
growth of transaction sizes); Douglas MacMillan, In Silicon Valley Frenzy, VCs Create New Inside
Track, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-silicon-valley-frenzy-vcscreate-new-inside-track-1427992176 (“[T]hese funds pose financial risks. A venture capitalist gets a
detailed look into a startup’s revenue, costs and financial projections before they make a decision to
invest. Buyers of SPVs are usually only offered a high-level view into the potential performance, not
detailed financial metrics.”).
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employees.146 Companies are often simultaneously negotiating with new investors—
disclosing limited information and setting prices—and buying back employee stock
or facilitating a third-party buyer to do so.147 Although these transactions allow companies to raise capital or increase liquidity, they may also provide opportunities for
deceiving investors and employees.
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR SECURITIES FRAUD IN PRIVATE COMPANIES

The private capital market is now characterized by an unprecedented amount
of money and stock transactions. Given regulatory and contractual restrictions on
trading, the result is neither a liquid and efficient market nor one completely lacking these features.148 In light of the lack of mandated disclosure, however, far less
information is available than in the public context and extreme information asymmetries can exist between trading parties. The discussion now turns, therefore, to
exploring this large and relatively dark market in terms of its potential for securities fraud.
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that it is, quite naturally, impossible to
know the extent of the problem.149 State enforcement actions provide one indication of magnitude—private offerings have been the most common source of
securities fraud.150 And, anecdotally, numerous startup stories have made headlines that reveal alleged misconduct that could have potentially touched upon
stock purchases or sales. In addition to the examples already highlighted, the past
few years have revealed a host of issues: NS8, a cyber-fraud software company,
allegedly had a CEO who defrauded investors by fabricating the company’s bank
statements for years to grossly inflate the amount of customer revenue;151
146. See NASDAQ PRIVATE MKT., supra note 140, at 5. Some investors, such as the Softbank Vision
Fund, have simultaneously participated in both primary and secondary transactions. See Dana Olsen,
Vision Fund 101: Inside SoftBank’s $98B Vehicle, PITCHBOOK (Aug. 2, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/
news/articles/vision-fund-101-inside-softbanks-93b-vehicle [https://perma.cc/8JSC-3ABC].
147. Companies may be exposed to risk, like employee lawsuits, to the extent that they reap significant
premiums from the “spread” between what employees are willing to sell for and what investors are willing to
pay. See Lax & Neville LLP, Tech Unicorns Engaging in Stock Buybacks Has Some Securities Law Experts
Worried, N.Y. SEC. LAW. BLOG (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.newyorksecuritieslawyerblog.com/techunicorns-engaging-stock-buybacks-securities-law-experts-worried [https://perma.cc/GCR4-US75] (“Uber
appear[ed] to be profiting off of [a] buyback, due to differing liquidity expectations of the buyers and sellers,
and the subsequent wide spread between the bid and ask of these private stock offerings.”).
148. See Gubler, supra note 116, at 758–61. Although different, the public and private markets may
act as substitutes for certain purposes. See id. at 752 (“The two securities markets—the public and the
private—serve many of the same functions (capital raising, liquidity generation, and price creation) and
therefore act as substitutes (albeit imperfect ones).”).
149. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act,
13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 254 (2013) (“The JOBS Act . . . [p]rovisions will make it possible for
many more firms to have freely traded securities without any affirmative federal periodic disclosure
obligations. The impact of this change on the extent to which investors will be harmed by an increase in
fraudulent activity is uncertain. The main reason for this uncertainty is our limited understanding of
what causes fraud.”).
150. See Bernard, supra note 38.
151. David Jeans, $150 Million to Bankrupt: Fraud Startup Tells Court It Had Just $25,000 Left
After CEO Arrest, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2020, 1:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidjeans/2020/10/
29/fraud-software-company-ns8-files-bankruptcy-after-ceo-arrest/?sh=4033b90f382e.
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LendingClub falsified loan transactions and failed to disclose the CEO–founder’s
conflict of interest;152 Zenefits, a human resources startup, admitted that its
employees cheated on mandatory compliance training central to its business
model;153 WrkRiot’s CEO–founder pleaded guilty to defrauding employees by
forging wire transfer documents;154 Skully’s founders faced a lawsuit alleging
that they engaged in fraudulent bookkeeping and widespread misuse of funds;155
Jumio, a mobile payments identification company, allegedly overstated its revenues to investors before going bankrupt;156 and Hampton Creek, a “sustainable
food” unicorn, raised venture capital using sales figures that reflected the company’s practice of secretly buying back huge amounts of its own products from
supermarket shelves.157
Although it is possible that these anecdotes of misconduct are exceptional, it is
worth exploring the factors that might contribute to the existence or prevalence of
securities fraud in the private market. The widely adopted framework known
as the “fraud triangle” identifies three main factors behind workplace fraud:
(1) pressure, (2) opportunity, and (3) rationalization.158 As the below discussion

152. See Max Chafkin & Noah Buhayar, How LendingClub’s Biggest Fanboy Uncovered Shady
Loans, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 18, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2016-08-18/how-lending-club-s-biggest-fanboy-uncovered-shady-loans; Peter Rudegair,
LendingClub CEO Fired Over Faulty Loans, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016, 7:45 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/lendingclub-ceo-resigns-over-sales-review-1462795070.
153. See Griffith, supra note 100, at 74–75; Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, Zenefits Compensates
Investors Over Past Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/
technology/zenefits-compensates-investors-over-past-misconduct.html. In 2017, Zenefits settled SEC
charges alleging that it misled investors in private offerings by making false statements about the license
qualifications of its employees to sell insurance. SEC, FILE NO. 3-18263, SEC: SAN FRANCISCO
SOFTWARE COMPANY AND FOUNDER SETTLE CHARGES OF MISLEADING INVESTORS ABOUT BUSINESS
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10429-s.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLQ7-WR32].
154. Jason Green, Silicon Valley Startup Founder Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Employees,
MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/05/silicon-valleystartup-founder-pleads-guilty-to-defrauding-employees [https://perma.cc/PF9G-G5FL]; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Silicon Valley CEO Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Employees of Tech
Company Start-Up (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-silicon-valley-ceo-pleadsguilty-defrauding-employees-tech-company-start [https://perma.cc/L6PH-SJQ5].
155. David Z. Morris, Suit Alleges Rampant Fraud at Collapsed HUD Helmet Maker Skully,
FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://fortune.com/2016/08/14/fraud-allegations-hud-skully.
156. Lucinda Shen, This Founder Just Agreed to Pay $17 Million to Settle a Fraud Charge. Now
He’s Heading an A.I. Startup, FORTUNE (Apr. 3, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/03/
jumio-silicon-valley-fraud-sec. The former CEO of Jumio, Daniel Mattes, paid over $17 million to settle
SEC charges that he defrauded investors. Id.
157. See Olivia Zaleski, Peter Waldman & Ellen Huet, How Hampton Creek Sold Silicon Valley on a
Fake-Mayo Miracle, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
features/2016-hampton-creek-just-mayo.
158. Joe McGrath, Why Do Good People Do Bad Things? A Multi-Level Analysis of Individual,
Organizational, and Structural Causes of White-Collar Crime, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 540 (2020)
(describing the fraud triangle, Donald Cressey’s “internationally prominent model”); see also EUGENE
SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 83–85 (2016) (describing
Cressey’s fraud triangle as “one of the most widely cited theories to explain managerial deviance in the
twenty-first century,” and noting its use by fraud examiners, securities regulators, and academics);
The Fraud Triangle, ASS’N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, https://www.acfe.com/fraud-triangle.aspx
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highlights, each may be present in venture-backed startups.159
1. Pressure
Although much is made of the pressure on public company managers in light
of quarterly earnings and the threat of shareholder activism, such pressure is comparable to or perhaps even less than that commonly experienced by startup managers pushed for survival and growth.160 Startups are typically unprofitable for
long periods of time and “burning” money, which means many startups are frequently operating on the brink of insolvency.161
Furthermore, by its nature, the venture-backed governance model tends to encourage risk-taking and aiming for potentially unattainable goals.162 Theranos
founder Elizabeth Holmes, for example, famously dazzled investors with her
promise of developing a blood-testing device that required just a single drop of
blood.163 Given the high rate of startup failures, each investment in a VC’s portfolio needs to potentially account for the fund’s entire return.164 As one venture
[https://perma.cc/YMW6-KCMV] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (discussing three components based on
Cressey’s book, Other People’s Money: “[p]erceived unshareable financial need,” “[p]erceived opportunity,”
and “[r]ationalization”).
159. Some scholars and criminologists have expanded the fraud triangle into a “fraud diamond” with
a fourth prong of “capability,” which refers to the personal traits necessary to turn an opportunity for
fraud into reality. See David T. Wolfe & Dana R. Hermanson, The Fraud Diamond: Considering the
Four Elements of Fraud, CPA J. (Dec. 2004), https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2546&context=facpubs [https://perma.cc/3N9Z-8SER]. Accordingly, in exploring the application of
the fraud triangle to the private company context, this Article’s discussion also highlights that the capabilities
that are often prized in entrepreneurs for business success—intelligence and hustle—are the same needed to
engage in fraud. See infra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., THIEL, supra note 110, at 87 (discussing importance to venture capitalists of investing
only in startups that have “the potential to succeed at vast scale”); Ranjay Gulati, The Soul of a StartUp, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2019, at 84 (describing how “[t]he urgent need for survival and then
pressures to scale up the business” can crush “the start-up spirit”); Prayag Narula, It’s Time to Talk
About Stress at Venture-Backed Tech Startups, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/04/20/its-time-to-talk-about-stress-at-venture-backed-tech-startups/
#1250284857ac (discussing the “[s]tress-induced mental health challenges,” including lack of sleep
and depression, which affect founders of venture-backed startups); Startup = Growth, PAUL GRAHAM
(Sept. 2012), http://www.paulgraham.com/growth.html [https://perma.cc/5HHU-KX3W] (“A startup
is a company designed to grow fast.”).
161. See THIEL, supra note 110, at 45 (noting that startups “often lose money for the first few years:
it takes time to build valuable things, and that means delayed revenue”); Pollman, supra note 99, at 167.
162. See Griffith, supra note 100, at 76 (“Even a founder with a strong moral compass and a heart full
of good intentions has to persuade investors, engineers, and customers to believe in a future where their
totally made-up idea will be real.”); Pollman, supra note 99, at 202–03 (discussing increasing
governance tensions that arise over time in venture-backed startups and how “[s]tartups must grow fast
to achieve an exit that benefits all participants without putting them at odds with each other”).
163. See Robert Glazer, The Spectacular Downfall of Elizabeth Holmes and Theranos Is the Best Startup
Cautionary Tale in Years. Here’s What You Should Learn, INC. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.inc.com/robertglazer/4-critical-leadership-lessons-from-elizabeth-holmes-theranoss-spectacular-downfall.html [https://perma.
cc/7SM9-NUKN].
164. See SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW TO GET IT 37–
38 (2019) (explaining how the distribution of deals in a fund follow the “power-law curve” in which a
small number of investments drive its success and “VCs are completely wrong about half the time and
lose most or all of the money that their investors entrusted to them as a result”); THIEL, supra note 110,
at 87 (noting that “every single company in a good venture portfolio must have the potential to succeed
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capitalist from the prominent firm Andreessen Horowitz explained, “all we really
care about is the at bats per home run”—meaning “the frequency with which the
VC gets a return of more than ten times her investment.”165 Venture capitalists—
with these incentives to push for mega hits for their own survival, profit, and ability to raise successive funds—sit on and sometimes control the startup’s board.166
CEO–founders often have invested seed money of their own or have relationships with investors, some of whom may be friends and family, which adds to
stress about losing investor money and raising new money to keep the company
going.167 Employees are also invested in the company through equity-based incentive compensation such that the potential payoff for the whole team, often personally recruited by the CEO–founder or executives, is typically at stake if the
company cannot continue to show enough promise to raise successive financing.
Further, startups are clustered in the technology sector and at the growth stages of
the life cycle—adding to challenges, the uncertainty of outcome, and the potential
of failure.
In sum, startups are often pressure cookers, and most, if not all, startup participants have some form of equity or “skin in the game” that adds to the urgency of
performance. In combination with other factors, this incessant pressure for
growth may cultivate securities fraud in venture-backed startups.
2. Opportunity
Free from mandatory reporting requirements, private companies have enormous ability to take advantage of information asymmetries—they can publicize
unaudited financials, share promising information about the company, or not
report at all.
Because VCs stage their investments to deal with the uncertainty inherent in
innovative startups, rounds of financing typically occur every twelve to twentyfour months,168 and disclosures to investors are negotiated as part of this transaction.169 Standard financing documents include a stock purchase agreement that
includes representations and warranties, with a schedule of exceptions that acts as

at vast scale”); Zider, supra note 110, at 136 (discussing the VC business model searching for mega
hits).
165. KUPOR, supra note 164, at 39–40 (illustrating this point by noting that a venture capitalist that
invested in early-stage, pre-IPO Facebook “could be wrong on everything else and still have a topperforming fund”).
166. Pollman, supra note 99, at 202–03.
167. Id. at 167, 170–71.
168. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 121 (noting the typical frequency of startups raising
rounds of financing); Smith, supra note 108, at 323 (describing staged financing).
169. See BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS 28 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing due
diligence materials and requests for information); BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP
BOARDS: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF YOUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS 40–41 (2014) (discussing board
observers). Shareholders may also negotiate for information rights or a board observer seat. See NAT’L
VENTURE CAPITALIST ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS: INVESTOR’S RIGHTS AGREEMENT 1 (2020),
https://perma.cc/S5KP-KZJV (providing for information and observer rights in model investor rights
agreement).
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an information-forcing device.170 These documents have tended to be relatively
lightly negotiated by lawyers in an effort to keep transaction costs down, particularly as VCs take a portfolio approach to investments and many startups ultimately fail.171 One consultant who helps investors conduct due diligence on
startups estimates that “[t]hree-quarters of the 150 early-stage startups he has
investigated have pitched investors with misleading or purposely incomplete
information.”172
In recent years, some high-profile startups have had leverage to keep information confidential—providing an opportunity to share misleading information and
conceal or delay disclosing bad news. Investors in one of Uber’s late-stage rounds
reportedly received no financial information beyond a set of risk factors.173
Shareholders in WeWork claimed the CEO–founder’s conflicts of interest were
not disclosed prior to the release of its IPO prospectus—once disclosed, these
issues, among others, were deemed so problematic by public market investors
that the company’s valuation was adjusted down from its last private valuation of
$47 billion to a suggested $20 billion, a number that still received so much skepticism that the public offering failed to get out of the gate.174
A number of other transactions, such as share buybacks, tender offers, and
M&A deals, pose similar issues concerning the information that is disclosed to
investors and provide an opportunity for material misrepresentations by the company. For example, when Good Technology sold to BlackBerry, employees

170. See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITALIST ASS’N, SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT 1, 5 (2020), https://perma.cc/89U3-R9K4 (providing model venture capital financing
documents); see also Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 215 (2009) (discussing how information is
communicated through the contracting process).
171. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS
L.J. 133, 140 & n.24 (2014). These representations can be a minefield, however. For example,
representations that a corporation is in legal compliance are common, but startups frequently bump up
against regulatory issues, sometimes even purposely operating in legal gray areas or in violation of legal
requirements. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 731–39 (2019)
[hereinafter Pollman, Corporate Disobedience] (discussing corporate disobedience related to innovation
and entrepreneurship); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL.
L. REV. 383, 398–403 (2017) (discussing regulatory entrepreneurship and breaking the law or taking
advantage of legal gray areas); NAT’L VENTURE CAPITALIST ASS’N, supra note 170, at 12 (including
representation that “[t]he Company is not in violation or default . . . [to its knowledge,] of any provision
of federal or state statute, rule or regulation applicable to the Company, the violation of which would
have a Material Adverse Effect”); see also Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in
Innovative Startups, in THE HANDBOOK ON LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D.
Gordon Smith et al. eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1) (identifying developments contributing to the
rise of regulatory affairs in startups).
172. Griffith, supra note 100, at 76.
173. Id. at 76–77.
174. See Maureen Farrell & Eliot Brown, WeWork Weighs Slashing Valuation by More than Half Amid
IPO Skepticism, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-parentweighs-slashing-its-valuation-roughly-in-half-11567689174; Liz Hoffman & Maureen Farrell, WeWork’s
Valuation Falls to $8 Billion Under SoftBank Rescue Offer, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-offers-to-put-6-5b-into-wework-including-5b-loan-11571687872.
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learned that, although company executives had assured them “not to worry”
because the company had pathways to success, including an IPO, the company
was actually lowering financial forecasts in investor documents and sliding toward a sale that demolished the value of the employees’ stock options.175 Some
employees had exercised their stock options and paid taxes based on a common
stock valuation ten times its ultimate worth—resulting in the situation that
employees were “essentially . . . paying to work for the company.”176
Furthermore, without periodic reporting and stock analysts, the mix of information available in the private capital market may be spotty at best, and a company’s “hype” to the media could have a disproportionate or misleading effect.
Such disclosures could be strategically used to pump valuations or hide misconduct or bad performance. Alternatively, insiders might trade on a secondary market without company-coordinated disclosures.177
Although the regulatory framework used to bifurcate more clearly the set of
startup participants holding stock or options to those who were sophisticated or
had access to information, now it is more likely that some of the shareholders or
option holders will be in neither position and may be more easily misled or kept
in the dark. Furthermore, companies may have not only the opportunity but also
an incentive to mislead startup employees into believing that their stock options
are worth more than they actually are. Startups may convince employees to
accept relatively meager salaries with the promise of stock options and to keep
them in their jobs to vest or receive refresh grants.178 They might promise
employees liquidity events such as a planned IPO or buybacks.
While private, Palantir’s offer letter, for example, “gave new hires the ability
to choose among three different pay packages, with lower cash salaries corresponding to higher amounts of stock options,” alongside a set of hypothetical valuations of the stock option grant imagining Palantir’s valuation were to grow to
$50, $100, or even $200 billion.179 The letter noted: “Although the values in the
175. Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-stumbles-itsemployees-get-hurt.html.
176. Id.
177. See Pollman, supra note 29, at 216–18 (discussing the potential for insider trading in private
company stock).
178. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1750–
53 (1994) (explaining that because startups provide “contingent compensation” in the form of equity,
“employees sacrifice the higher cash salary” they might obtain at “more established companies”); Yifat
Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1263–72 (2018) (describing the ability of stock options to “handcuff” employees to
startups); Nicholas Iovino, Uber Accused of Luring Talent with False Promises, COURTHOUSE NEWS
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/uber-accused-of-luring-talent-with-false-promises
[https://perma.cc/4Y8C-WF3Y] (discussing a class action lawsuit alleging that Uber “lured hundreds of
high-tech workers with false promises of more valuable stock options before quickly breaking that
pledge for its own financial benefit”).
179. William Alden, Ex-Palantir Employees Are Struggling to Sell Their Shares, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Oct. 28, 2016, 2:23 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/williamalden/ex-palantir-employeesare-struggling-to-sell-their-shares [https://perma.cc/N2YL-8WDB].
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table below are hypothetical and inherently uncertain, we want to emphasize our
belief in Palantir’s potential to become a $100 billion company.”180 The potential
for mischief is apparent.181
Finally, the governance structure of venture-backed startups might present opportunity for carrying out securities fraud. Startup boards are typically dominated
by founders and VCs—they typically allocate only one-quarter or fewer seats to
independent directors.182 Some of the largest startups by valuation have dualclass structures that give control to founders through supervoting shares, further
weakening governance mechanisms for oversight and discipline, as illustrated by
the Theranos case.183 Empirical literature studying public companies has linked
financial misconduct to corporate boards lacking independence or financial and
accounting expertise184—both of which are commonplace in private companies.
3. Rationalization
Startup and tech company culture have become known for the concept of “disruption” and slogans such as “move fast and break things.”185 Innovative companies often bump up against, disregard, or even intentionally disobey laws in their
quests to develop new technology.186 Recent research finds that people who
180. Id.
181. Employees might be easily misled regarding the valuation of the company based on a preferred
stock financing round versus their common stock. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 123
(noting that employees’ lack of knowledge of Square’s complex capital structure would lead to a 262%
overvaluation of their stock options).
182. See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 461, 462 (discussing the composition of startup boards and independent directors); Pollman, supra
note 99, at 200–09 (discussing a lack of board independence and monitoring in startups).
183. See CARREYROU, supra note 8, at 298; Jones, supra note 117, at 174; id. at 169 (arguing that
“recent market trends and deregulatory reforms have weakened or eliminated the principal mechanisms
that imposed discipline on start-up company founders”); Pollman, supra note 99, at 182, 203–06
(discussing founder-friendly governance structures in startups and oversight weakness); see also Zohar
Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 580–81,
589–90 (2016) (discussing dual-class structures and observing the value of entrepreneurs controlling
management decisions to pursue their “idiosyncratic vision” under conditions of information asymmetry
or differences of opinion).
184. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals,
48 J.L. & ECON. 371, 371 (2005) (finding “that the probability of restatement is lower in companies
whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with financial expertise; it is higher in
companies in which the chief executive officer belongs to the founding family”); Mark S. Beasley, An
Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement
Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 443–45 (1996) (finding that “no-fraud firms have boards with significantly
higher percentages of outside members than fraud firms”); Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan &
Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to
Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 1–2 (1996) (finding that “an important
motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost” and firms that
manipulate earnings are more likely to have boards dominated by management and a CEO who is also
the firm’s founder).
185. See THIEL, supra note 110, at 56 (“Silicon Valley has become obsessed with ‘disruption.’”);
Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-and-break-things-is-over (“Many of today’s entrepreneurs
live by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s now-famous motto: ‘Move fast and break things.’”).
186. Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, supra note 171, at 735.
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become entrepreneurs are more likely than others to have had high self-esteem,
to have scored highly on learning aptitude tests, and to have engaged in more disruptive, illicit activities in their youth.187 This kind of rule-breaking spirit and
conduct has become normalized and even celebrated—from Steve Jobs flying
the pirate flag at Apple188 to Uber’s early mantra “always be hustlin’” which
became “[w]e do the right thing” once the company prepared to go public.189
Entrepreneurs may rationalize their behavior and business strategies through a
process psychologists call “moral disengagement”—for example, thinking certain regulations are unnecessary and thus that it is not bad to violate them.190
There are various ways this process of moral disengagement or rationalizing
mentality might play out in the context of securities fraud in private companies.
The path to corporate fraud may start out with innocent confidence and optimism.191 Managers are known to be optimistic in their appraisals.192 Because
startup founders in particular are often optimistic by nature and situationally
encouraged by their venture capital investors to aim for home runs, their estimates may be favorably high.193 When performance falls short, managers and
founders might interpret this as a temporary setback that can be overcome and
deny the bad news.194 The small step from innocent optimism to denying negative
187. See Ross Levine & Yona Rubinstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do
They Earn More?, 132 Q.J. ECON. 963, 963 (2017) (“The combination of ‘smart’ and ‘illicit’ tendencies
as youths accounts for both entry into entrepreneurship and the comparative earnings of
entrepreneurs.”); see also Griffith, supra note 100, at 76 (quoting a startup industry insider that there is
“a fine line between entrepreneurship and criminality”).
188. Sarah Todd, The Steve Jobs Speech That Made Silicon Valley Obsessed with Pirates, QUARTZ
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://qz.com/1719898/steve-jobs-speech-that-made-silicon-valley-obsessed-withpirates (noting that Steve Jobs famously motivated Apple’s developers in 1983 by telling them that
“[it]’s better to be a pirate than join the navy,” and explaining how the pirate flag came to embody “a
certain willingness to plunder”).
189. Jena McGregor, ‘Hustlin’ Is Out. Doing ‘the Right Thing’ Is In. Uber Has Rewritten Its Notorious
List of Core Values, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2017/11/08/hustlin-is-out-doing-the-right-thing-is-in-uber-has-rewritten-its-notorious-list-ofcore-values (quoting Dara Khosrowshahi, who replaced the CEO–founder and stated: “[T]he culture
and approach that got Uber where it is today is not what will get us to the next level.”).
190. Noam Scheiber, The Shkreli Syndrome: Youthful Trouble, Tech Success, Then a Fall, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/entrepreneur-young-trouble.
html (citing psychologist Laurence Steinberg); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 42 (“Cultures
enable beliefs about the law’s legitimacy that can be either positive or negative relative to other values,
and when the latter, compliance falls.”).
191. Survey evidence indicates that financial managers believe excessive optimism is common
among their peers. LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 35; see Robert Libby & Kristina Rennekamp, SelfServing Attribution Bias, Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts, 50 J. ACCT. RES.
197, 198–200 (2012).
192. See Anwer S. Ahmed & Scott Duellman, Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting
Conservatism, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 2–4 (2013).
193. See Noam Wasserman, How an Entrepreneur’s Passion Can Destroy a Startup: Founders Need
to Believe in Their Ideas and Their Business; but They Can Believe Too Much, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25,
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-an-entrepreneur-s-passion-can-destroy-a-startup-1408912044
(analyzing 16,000 startup founders, and finding the “consistent theme” among them is their “passion”
and “contagious enthusiasm”).
194. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 35.
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developments may fall into mental blind spots or be rationalized by self-serving
wishful thinking.
From this point, innocent optimism might evolve into deliberate deception.195
Managers or founders might deflect the truth to buy time.196 They might choose
to follow down this slippery slope of deception, particularly as founders or managers realize that the company and its stakeholders, including employees and customers, would be hurt if the deception were revealed.197
The cognitive pressure to justify deception grows, particularly as the actor has
already committed to a rosier narrative. As Donald Langevoort has observed,
“The more leaders believe in group goals, the more they think of themselves as
justified in taking unethical actions on behalf of the group.”198 Research also indicates that trying to meet “frustratingly high performance goals” depletes ethicality and can make eventual dishonesty more likely.199 If the situation does not
improve and the company is truly in trouble, the genuine optimism from the outset might be replaced with fear about survival and the possibility that the managers or founders will be viewed as having lied all along.200
Many frauds go through stages of awareness that end with a guilty state of
mind.201 In private companies, without public disclosures of quarterly earnings
and analysts, this “optimism-commitment” pattern could fester for longer periods
of time or manifest in particularly pernicious forms of pressure for risk-taking activity to achieve or maintain high valuations. Startups often lack internal controls
and outside auditing that could detect problems before they evolve into the stage
of intentional deception.202 And once detected, insiders and investors might
choose to bury the fraud rather than expose it and risk being associated with the
misconduct. Private companies often offer the opportunity for more active
engagement, which might both facilitate detection but also risk complicity.

195. See Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery
Slope to Financial Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311, 314 (2012).
196. LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 36.
197. Id. (“Psychology research shows that people are more willing to cheat when the benefit will go
to a family member or colleague rather than only to themselves.”).
198. Id. (citing Crystal L. Hoyt, Terry L. Price & Alyson E. Emrick, Leadership and the MoreImportant-than-Average Effect: Overestimation of Group Goals and the Justification of Unethical
Behavior, 6 LEADERSHIP 391, 391–93 (2010)).
199. Id. (citing David T. Welsh & Lisa D. Ordó~
nez, The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance
Goals: Linking Goal Setting, Depletion, and Unethical Behavior, 123 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79, 80–81 (2014)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 43.
202. See DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, SCALING UP: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN PRE-IPO COMPANIES 1 (2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-2018-scaling-up-the-implementation-of-corporate-governance-in-preipo-companies_0.pdf?pid= [https://perma.cc/73KT-2CQ2]; Jonny Frank, Fraud Risk Assessments:
Audits Focused on Identifying Fraud-Related Exposures Can Serve as the Cornerstone of an Effective
Antifraud Program, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Apr. 2004, at 40, 40–47 (discussing the role of auditors in
preventing and detecting fraud).
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Research suggests “that dysfunctional corporate cultures are a main reason that
frauds occur.”203
Furthermore, the rationalization of fraud seems to spread through business culture or competitive pressures. One study found that the incidence of financial
fraud by one company makes it more likely that others, even in different industries, will commit fraud too.204 Social norms and business culture affect a wide
range of misbehaviors, including fraud and other financial misconduct.205 This
research calls to mind the stock option backdating scandal that spread through
Silicon Valley in the early 2000s, perhaps through directors serving on interlocking boards of directors and sharing knowledge about manipulating option
grants.206 In sum, all of the contextual factors or elements that can give rise to
fraud not only exist but also may be relatively commonplace in the private market, particularly in venture-backed startups.
C. OBSTACLES TO RULE 10B–5 CLASS ACTIONS IN PRIVATE MARKETS

The previous Sections examine the growth of the private capital market and
the potential for securities fraud. This Section analyzes the differences between
the private and public market that prevent securities fraud class actions from
playing a similar role in the private market as in the public. Although contested,
private class actions are understood to serve a monitoring and deterrence
function207—something that the private capital market needs. A variety of factors

203. LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 41; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107–08 (1997) (providing “a robust set of explanations for why
managers of a public corporation would mislead stock market investors either in their filings or in
ongoing publicity efforts,” including an institutional theory of “corporate cultural biases, particularly
optimistic ones” that serve as “adaptive mechanisms for encouraging trust and cooperation”).
204. Christopher A. Parsons, Johan Sulaeman & Sheridan Titman, The Geography of Financial
Misconduct, 73 J. FIN. 2087, 2090 (2018) (finding that “firms are more likely to commit [financial
misconduct] when their industry (nonlocal) peers do so, as well as when the [financial misconduct] rate
for local (nonindustry) peers is higher than average”).
205. Id. at 2089.
206. See John Bizjak, Michael Lemmon & Ryan Whitby, Option Backdating and Board Interlocks,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4821, 4822–23 (2009).
207. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 70 (2011) (arguing that “a superior enforcement outcome” would require private
plaintiffs “to meet an actual-reliance standard” and because this would diminish private litigation, “a
compensating increase in public-enforcement capability” is due); Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud
Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 453, 467 (2015) (arguing that the
collaboration between Congress and the Supreme Court to develop the private class action for federal
securities fraud is a “lawmaking partnership” that offers the advantages of “efficiency, political
insulation, and comparative institutional competence”); Rose, supra note 53, at 50 (arguing that “[fraudon-the-market (FOTM)] suits might be thought of as a way for shareholders to outsource the monitoring
of corporate agents [because] . . . the class action bar—lured by the prospect of large attorneys’ fees—is
delegated the job of detecting FOTM; once the discovered fraud is revealed through the filing of a class
action complaint, shareholders may in turn impose punishment as appropriate”); Hillary A. Sale &
Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 487, 487 (2015) (“Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of
securities fraud and the protection of securities markets.”).
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may explain why securities class actions have not played a significant role to date
in the private capital market: the lack of fluid pricing to identify potential suits,
impediments to aggregate litigation, and the different economics of the lawsuit.
As to the first, the private capital market is no longer entirely opaque regarding
pricing, but even with significant increases in secondary trading, it is a semiilliquid market lacking informational efficiency and transparency. Because venture-backed startups typically issue preferred stock to investors such as VCs and
other institutional investors, the price of a particular series of stock reflects a specific set of contractual features that varies from other series issued by the same
company.208 Significant amounts of time often pass in between rounds of stock
issuances, and there may be no trading in between, all while new material information is developing for the company. Valuations reflect the views of the company’s enthusiasts; it is not possible to short sell private company stock.209
Moreover, views about valuation can vary widely and can change dramatically
with little notice or transparency.210 All of these factors contribute to the lack of
available information about stock price that would allow attorneys to monitor for
stock drops followed by corrective disclosures—a typical technique for identifying potential securities fraud suits.211
As a related point, there might be significant frictions to bringing aggregate litigation in the private company context. The fraud-on-the-market theory would not
apply given the lack of an efficient market as the Supreme Court described in
Basic v. Levinson212 and reaffirmed in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
208. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 94, at 120; Pollman, supra note 99, at 172–74.
209. See Matt Levine, Opinion, The Trades Will Be Free Now, BLOOMBERG: MONEY STUFF (Oct. 2,
2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-02/the-trades-will-be-freenow (noting that markets correct pricing through supply principles). For a discussion of how “negative
activists can play an important, and indeed helpful, role in financial markets,” see Barbara A. Bliss,
Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1333, 1376 (2020).
210. For example, Morgan Stanley’s mutual funds valued Palantir at $4.4 billion at the same time
that several other Palantir investors appraised it higher, and Morgan Stanley’s own bankers predicted
that the company could price nine times as much in an IPO. See Lizette Chapman & Sonali Basak,
Palantir Tried Buying Morgan Stanley’s Stake in Value Feud, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2018, 10:22 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-14/palantir-said-to-try-buying-morgan-stanley-sstake-in-value-feud.
211. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Park, supra note 123, at 141 (“Securities law
targets a particular kind of investor injury that is triggered by the purchase or sale of securities at a
distorted price.”). This point highlights that public market stock prices are a public good. See de
Fontenay, supra note 103, at 449 (“[P]ublic companies’ mandatory disclosure and stock trading prices
provide a major information subsidy to private companies. . . .”); Clayton, 2019 Remarks, supra note 92
(“Prices for stocks, bonds, and other assets, generated by markets that are transparent, information rich
and fair, are of immense value to our economy. They are . . . ‘public goods[,]’ [and g]enerally, once
prices are published, we can all use them.”).
212. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. For arguments that the fraud-on-the-market
theory should not be limited by the concept of the efficient market hypothesis, see Zohar Goshen &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 712, 719 (2006)
(arguing for “the use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in all fraud cases even when markets are
inefficient”) and Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 176 (2002) (arguing that “the [efficient
market hypothesis] is unnecessary to justify the Court’s approach” to fraud-on-the-market reliance and
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Inc. (Halliburton II).213 The individual reliance of each shareholder would have
to be shown.214 The shareholders might be positioned differently such that a class
could not be easily maintained. Shareholders in startups often vary in the amounts
of different classes and series of stock that they hold on different terms.215
Furthermore, there could be difficulty in actually building a class of shareholders who want to be included in the lawsuit. Traditional VC and private equity
investors have been assumed to be sophisticated players who understand and
manage these risks. They perform their own due diligence and place bets in a
portfolio of companies, knowing that many may fail for various reasons, including for misconduct or mismanagement. In particular, the portfolio approach of
VC investing that seeks a small number of mega hits allows for a buffer for some
amount of loss from fraud. There may be little to gain from pursuing private
action against bad actors in these situations—no deep pockets to seek recompense, and it could be bad for a VC’s reputation.216 Further, some VCs actively
manage their investments by sitting on company boards, and they might have
failed to catch the fraud and could be exposed to litigation risk in their own right.
This point has its limits, however. Although the rationale of risk spreading
through a portfolio of investments may work for venture capitalists and private
equity investors, it does not eliminate the potential impact of a massive business
failure on other shareholders (and stakeholders).217 Furthermore, with private
companies reaching high valuations and staying private longer, the potential
impact is greater in terms of financial magnitude and number and type of participants affected. Even venture capitalists may not fare well with spreading risk
through a portfolio approach when valuations are skyrocketing.
“[o]ne can readily justify the presumption as the only workable way to facilitate private litigation in this
area, substituting causation in place of reliance”).
213. 573 U.S. 258, 264, 283–84 (2014) (reaffirming the fraud-on-the-market presumption in a class
action against Halliburton and one of its executives for alleged misrepresentations regarding potential
liability in asbestos litigation, expected revenue, and anticipated benefits from a merger). For a
discussion of the case, see generally Allen Ferrell & Andrew Roper, Price Impact, Materiality, and
Halliburton II, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 553 (2015); Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-onthe-Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (2015);
and Geoffrey Miller, The Problem of Reliance in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 61
(2015).
214. This might be an impediment to maintaining suit as a class or may add cost to doing so, but it
might still be possible to show reliance through transaction-specific documents. See Glater, supra note
29, at 50–51 (“An investor who files a lawsuit alleging fraud after purchasing securities through a
private placement (a transaction available essentially by invitation only) can draw on transactionspecific information that is more detailed and relevant than disclosures in an annual report, for
example.” (footnotes omitted)).
215. See Pollman, supra note 99, at 179–99 (explaining that differences in shareholder positions in
startups and terms can give rise to conflicts among shareholders of all types).
216. See David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 J. CORP. L. 419, 420–21 (2003)
(discussing reputation and high overall fund returns as reasons why there has historically been little
litigation in the venture capital ecosystem); cf. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 259, 293 (2010) (noting historically little litigation in the private equity context between
fund managers and investors).
217. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 197–98 (“Such antifraud-only markets may be acceptable for
institutional players, but they are not designed for individual investors.”).
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The economics of the lawsuit, however, might be problematic for plaintiffs’
attorneys. Attorneys’ fees are mainly driven by recoveries.218 Therefore, “the
larger the potential payout, the more willing a rational plaintiffs’ lawyer is to pursue a case with a smaller likelihood of success.”219 This dynamic likely attracts
attorneys toward large public corporation cases even if there are meritorious
cases against private companies. Furthermore, the number of shareholders
affected to join a private class action will nearly always be fewer than in the public company context because private companies must avoid the 2,000 holders-ofrecord threshold under Section 12(g) in order to stay private.220 The availability
(or lack) of directors and officers (D&O) insurance in the private company context, and limits in coverage, might also affect the prospect of suit from the attorneys’ perspectives.221 In addition, given the potentially smaller scale of lawsuit,
the expense of hiring experts could also make bringing suit less attractive as a
matter of economics.
Finally, the likely gains from compensatory money damages differ in public
and private contexts. In the public company setting, one of the key criticisms of
securities class actions is that because corporate defendants tend to fund settlements, it is the public company shareholders who ultimately pay, giving rise to a
“circularity” of the money flows.222 As some class members will continue to hold
shares, some portion of the class will fund a portion of their own recovery, and on

218. For a discussion of how judges set fee and cost awards in securities class actions, see generally
Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of FeeSetting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015).
219. Rose, supra note 53, at 47; see also Berdejó, supra note 29, at 581 (“The structure of attorney
compensation in class actions renders these ineffective in the context of small-scale fraud, which results
in a skewed composition of securities fraud class actions favoring cases involving large-scale fraud.”);
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53
DUKE L.J. 737, 744 (2003) (“In many cases, the loss suffered by the plaintiff or even a group of plaintiffs
may not rise to a sufficient level to attract the interest of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorney.”).
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2018). Employees with stock options do not count toward this
threshold and may not have standing to sue for securities fraud. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 81
F. Supp. 2d 550, 555–58 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that employees were not “purchasers or sellers” of any
securities, as required for a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 action); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 544, 550 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that former employee lacked standing to bring private
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 because employee had not purchased or sold any of the stock
options received under employee stock option plan); Aran, supra note 130, at 892 n.98 (noting that the
JOBS Act of 2012 “allow[ed] companies to exclude securities held by Rule 701 offerees when
counting” shareholders of record); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock
Options and Rule 10b–5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542–43 (2003) (discussing case law ruling that
employee stock option holders lack standing to bring Rule 10b–5 actions); Cable, supra note 130, at 625
(“The JOBS Act . . . significantly relaxed the 12(g) threshold by exempting shares that traced back to
Rule 701.”).
221. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801–06 (2007) (discussing D&O insurance
and shareholder litigation).
222. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535–36, 1536 n.5, 1558 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting
the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 334.
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a macro level, over time they will be on the paying side as often as on the receiving side. Diversified investors in public company stock may not, therefore, ultimately benefit on a net basis from fraud-on-the-market settlements—they may
simply “produce wealth transfers among shareholders that neither compensate
nor deter.”223
Private company shareholders do not have the same circularity problem on a
macro level because they are often not truly diversified. However, private company shareholders have a different potential problem that is more likely: the company may not have funds available for a settlement or to pay damages, the
individuals responsible may not have deep pockets, and any payout might effectively be the shareholder’s own money. For example, the SEC levied a variety of
fines and penalties against Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes, but only a relatively
small sum of money might be recovered from Holmes, and the shares she
returned had little value because the company was already defaulting on credit
agreements with few assets.224
On the whole, for the reasons explained, plaintiffs’ attorneys face obstacles to
bringing securities fraud class actions in the private company context, and in
many circumstances, investors may have little incentive to sue. Sophisticated
investors might price this reality into their investments and instead invest in ex
ante monitoring mechanisms—which could work reasonably well on an individual level for some investors but represent significant deadweight costs in the aggregate that skew the efficient allocation of capital in this increasingly important
sector of the economy.
III. THE FUTURE OF POLICING FRAUD IN PRIVATE MARKETS
The previous Parts have illuminated the development of Rule 10b–5 in the
public market paradigm and the lack of fit of this jurisprudence to the private markets, despite the potential for widespread misconduct. The dominant mode of
securities fraud enforcement in the public company context is through class
action suits brought by plaintiff lawyers. This mechanism is lacking in the private
market context and unlikely to develop in a similar fashion.
This confluence of factors leads to the question of what, if anything, should
be done about securities fraud in the private markets. This Part takes up that
question by examining a variety of potential responses: maintaining the status
quo, increasing public enforcement, adjusting the public–private line, and exploring alternative mechanisms to increase accountability in private companies.
Although there is some merit to the status quo approach, a stronger case exists for
increasing public enforcement and further considering bolder or more finely
tuned regulatory change.
223. Coffee, supra note 222, at 1536; see id. at 1558; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985).
224. See Reed Abelson, Theranos Is Shutting Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/09/05/health/theranos-shutting-down.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, supra note 15.
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A. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Debate about the optimal amount of securities fraud enforcement has raged
with little regard for private companies. One view upon examination of the issue
might be that little, if anything, additional needs to be done. The SEC’s resources
are limited.225 To the extent that securities class actions are ineffective in achieving compensation of victims or deterrence of wrongful conduct, critics might
urge that this activity not be imported into the private capital market.226
Indeed, some observers might view the relative paucity of securities litigation
in private companies as an advantage of staying private.227 Venture capitalists are
key victims of securities fraud in the startup context, and they already have an incentive to engage in due diligence and monitoring. In some instances, they selfpolice by uncovering fraud and addressing the issue internally.228 If liability were
to increase, venture-backed startups would likely pay more for insurance, which
in turn might increase the cost of investment without creating corresponding gain
for investors or—worse yet—chill entrepreneurship and innovation. A similar
story can be told about private equity investors and the optimal level of liability
and insurance.
Furthermore, reasonable minds might differ regarding how to balance the goals
of investor protection and capital formation. The JOBS Act, for example, provides for deregulated forms of capital raising such as crowdfunding based on
the notion “that putting more risk on these investors is worth it to enable smallbusiness entrepreneurship and job creation.”229 Similarly, with respect to securities fraud in the private market, one might believe “the social good offset[s] the
investor harm suffered.”230 For example, Donald Langevoort explains this viewpoint as one of pursuing the greater good: “Amid all the creative destruction
when the [late-1990s] bubble formed and then popped, the Internet was born and

225. Cox et al., supra note 219, at 751–52.
226. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 222, at 1535–36 (discussing the “fundamental problem” of
securities class action litigation as the failure to compensate victims of fraud and to deter potential
wrongdoers); Cox et al., supra note 219, at 741 (“[T]here are two very different perspectives of the role
of private suits in the enforcement of the securities laws: one perspective enlists plaintiffs as private
attorneys general, and the other perspective paints the same plaintiffs as vexatious litigants.”); Jill E.
Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 815 (2009)
(noting that critics have argued that the class action “is largely ineffective” and have “urged that private
litigation be substantially reduced or eliminated”).
227. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, The SEC’s Facebook Fiasco, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703954004576089840802830596 (“In a public
offering, shares are bought by representatives of plaintiffs’ law firms, and if the share price goes down
significantly after the offering, the issuer and underwriters typically get sued for having misrepresented
the merits of the deal. This is far less likely to happen in a private placement.”).
228. See, e.g., Robert Freedman, HeadSpin Said to Be Returning $95M After Review Finds
Irregularities, CFO DIVE (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.cfodive.com/news/headspin-said-to-be-returning95m-after-review-finds-irregularities/582875 [https://perma.cc/6SPP-QLAW] (describing a venturebacked startup in which an internal review of financial irregularities by a special board committee led to
firing executives, returning cash to investors, and recapitalizing the company).
229. LANGEVOORT, supra note 37, at 2.
230. Id.
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began maturing, with the United States well in the lead in global technology innovation.”231 Within bounds, “a moderate excess of investor confidence can
enhance capital formation. If so, . . . [t]he law should take a light touch.”232
Another viewpoint in support of the status quo might focus on the nature of
innovative technology companies that constitute a significant portion of the private capital market. As valuations of private technology startups are at times subjective or unreliable, one might worry that increased securities litigation and
enforcement would have an overdeterrent effect because valuation fluctuations
and failures might be confused with misconduct in hindsight.
Along a similar vein, innovative companies may need a long leash during the
early part of their life cycle. It may be that “in an economy that values innovation
and aggressiveness—creative disruption—transparency doesn’t work well.
Private equity-style financing, allowing more confidential forms of governance,
may be better.”233 Venture- and private-equity-backed companies may benefit, on
average, from being allowed to operate largely in the dark and not to disclose significant amounts of information while they are in their most innovative or transformational phase—for competitive reasons and to give the company space to
nimbly adjust and pivot from product ideas or business models. Furthermore,
from the perspective of VCs, early stage investing is anyway speculative and
investment decisions are made on intuitions about the promise of the team and
market opportunity.234 Enforcing representations about early-stage investments
makes little sense if the parties involved understood, despite the hype, that the
company was high-risk and the bet was on future performance. In addition, for a
VC it might make little difference if a loss in the portfolio comes from a company
that made material misstatements or one that simply failed to successfully execute the business plan or develop technology—in fact, on the whole they might
prefer to invest in teams and companies that push boundaries even if that means
that some will cross the line.235
Most fundamentally, one might argue that investors in private capital markets
are typically sophisticated or accredited investors such that they can bear the loss
and are not a vulnerable class.236 Private equity and venture-backed governance
231. Id. at 17.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 165; see Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Role of Accounting in the Twenty-First Century Firm,
45 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 485, 503 (2015).
234. See KUPOR, supra note 164, at 42–52 (explaining that early-stage VCs decide to invest based on
people and team, the process the founder used to get to the current product idea, and market size).
235. See, e.g., Polina Marinova, Why VC Tim Draper Keeps Defending Theranos CEO Elizabeth
Holmes, FORTUNE (May 11, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/05/11/tim-draper-theranoselizabeth-holmes (“Look, when I’m an investor in a startup, I assume that 60% of them are going to go
out of business . . . I make my money on a few extraordinary companies. Theranos was one of those
extraordinary companies that could’ve been one of those big, huge winners.” (quoting a venture
capitalist)).
236. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response, Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 2025, 2029 (2013) (observing that investors who buy preferred stock in startups are “quite
sophisticated”).
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are often assumed to have fewer agency costs because ownership and control are
not entirely separated, and investors play a monitoring role.237 As the next
Section explores, however, this view does not account for potential harms to other
shareholders and stakeholders.
B. INCREASING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

The threat of SEC engagement has hung over Silicon Valley and the world of
technology startups as the private capital market grows. In 2016, then-SEC Chair,
Mary Jo White, gave a speech at Stanford Law School, encouraging startups to
concern themselves with transparent disclosure, financial controls, and good corporate governance.238 She noted that the SEC was watching the secondary market
for trading pre-IPO shares.239 The previous year, the SEC brought its first
enforcement action under the Dodd-Frank Act’s rules that require registering security-based swaps or limiting them to “eligible contract participant[s].”240
Specifically, the SEC detected violations by a Silicon Valley-based startup, Sand
Hill Exchange, which illegally offered and sold derivative contracts based on the
value of pre-IPO shares.241 The platform was quickly shut down.242 Further, not
long after Chair White’s speech, the SEC launched its investigation of Theranos,
which eventually resulted in a settlement with CEO–founder Elizabeth Holmes,
as discussed above.243
Yet, despite these warnings, the relative infrequency of actions has given an
empty tone to the SEC threat.244 Until startups prepare to go public, they are
237. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 359
(2019) (describing the private equity board model as “thickly informed, well-resourced, and highly
motivated” and includes members with deal and operations experience as well as an outside director
with industry-specific experience); Pollman, supra note 99, at 200–09 (explaining and critiquing the
conventional view that VCs are strong monitors).
238. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock
Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html [https://perma.cc/
NDL4-K9XN]).
239. See id.
240. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Action for Illegal
Offering of Security-Based Swaps (June 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-123.
html [https://perma.cc/ES5E-UMD5].
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. It also pursued two former executives of Lucent Polymers
Inc., a private company that manufactured plastic, for allegedly making false claims about its technology,
making deceptive marketing reports, and submitting fraudulent data to auditors. Michael S. Dicke & Vincent
Barredo, SEC and DOJ Charge Former Executives of Private Company for Misrepresenting Company’s the
Technology, FENWICK (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.fenwick.com/Publications/Pages/SEC-and-DOJ-ChargeFormer-Executives-of-Private-Company-for-Misrepresenting-the-Companys-Technology.aspx [https://perma.
cc/HQK7-9CTM].
244. Before Chair White’s 2016 speech in Silicon Valley, one of the few private company
enforcement actions dated to 2011, in a case alleging that Stiefel Labs, a family-owned business, had
undervalued employee stock for buybacks, while the CEO was aware that the equity valuation was low
and misleading because the company was in negotiations for a sale to GlaxoSmithKline. See Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges GlaxoSmithKline Subsidiary and Former CEO with
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under no obligation to follow advice for better governance and may be unlikely
to take heed without a greater possibility of SEC activity in the space. Some
observers were quick to criticize the lack of clarity from the SEC, noting that
vague threats regarding SEC interest in frothy valuations only adds uncertainty.245 Some enforcement actions have followed in subsequent years but have
not illuminated a clear picture that enforcement against private company frauds is
a priority on the agency’s agenda.246
A variety of arguments weigh in favor of increasing SEC enforcement through
clear and consistent action. Above all, the sheer size of the private company market and of certain late-stage startups means that if the SEC maintains the longstanding allocation of enforcement between public and private markets, it is
giving considerably fewer proportional resources than in times past to the private
side of the line.247 Higher enforcement might encourage allocational efficiency
and the quality of private company offerings.248
Furthermore, VCs are not always the strong monitors they are assumed to be
because they not only serve in overlapping roles as board members and shareholders but also are repeat institutional players in a reputation-based market for
investments.249 The “fire-the-founder” era of the twentieth century gave way to a
“founder-friendly” era of the twenty-first century with competitive pressures on
VCs.250 Startup governance may not sufficiently constrain the social costs of
high-growth, innovative startups.251

Defrauding Employees in Stock Plan (Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-261.
htm [https://perma.cc/W2NB-5EW6].
245. See Jacob Pramuk, Mark Cuban: Here’s the Problem with Regulators, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2016,
11:14 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/01/mark-cuban-heres-the-problem-with-regulators.html
[https://perma.cc/S7RN-LMVT].
246. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion, You Can Relax Once You’re in the Index, BLOOMBERG (July 28,
2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-28/you-can-relax-once-youre-in-the-index (referring to two actions against private companies as a “mini-wave of private fraud
enforcement actions”). Recent enforcement actions against private startups and their CEO–founders
include those against YouPlus, Inc. and Trustify Inc. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Charges Silicon Valley Start-Up and CEO with Defrauding Investors (July 20, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-160 [https://perma.cc/C2WG-VMRP]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Trustify Inc. and Founder in $18.5 Million Offering Fraud (July 24,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-162 [https://perma.cc/YK2S-W97P].
247. The SEC also has certain advantages over private litigants. See Buell, supra note 26, at 546
(“When it charges securities fraud, the SEC is not a victim seeking damages, so it need not show that it
did anything, much less that it acted in reliance on anything the defendant did. Nor does the SEC need to
show that it suffered any loss.”).
248. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
229, 230 (2007) (arguing that “higher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of
capital and higher securities valuations”); Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045,
1065 (2019) (“When coupled with enforcement and litigation, the system is designed to increase the
odds of a strong and healthy market system—where fraud is policed and punished and capital is
allocated efficiently.”).
249. See Pollman, supra note 99 (explaining why some startup boards have monitoring failures).
250. See Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 2017, at 94.
251. See id.
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Additionally, VCs can spread their risk through a portfolio of investments,
but this does not eliminate the potential impact of securities fraud on other
shareholders and stakeholders. Accredited investor status does not necessarily reflect true sophistication.252 Retail investors are exposed to securities
fraud in private companies through their investments in mutual funds and
pension funds. Employees often receive a significant portion of their compensation as stock or stock options, and they cannot easily diversify their risk—
they can only work full-time for one company at a time, and they are usually
not in a position to invest in other private companies. And, critically, the
harm to employees, consumers, and others from large business failures can
be significant. As Urska Velikonja has argued, empirical evidence suggests
that “harm to nonshareholders dwarfs that suffered by defrauded shareholders,” and these “other market participants cannot easily self-insure.”253 Given
the large footprint of some private companies, the impact on the public can
be meaningful.254
Protective devices that sophisticated investors contract for in VC deals such as
IPO ratchets in some way counteract harm from fraud—but that only protects the
holder of the right, typically the last money invested in a company, and other
investors and stakeholders might suffer. Employees typically hold common stock
or options, not preferred stock with contractual mechanisms.255 Their stock or
options are based on valuations that employees typically do not have the ability

252. Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1558–59 (noting that trading even among accredited investors
“raises serious questions about investor protection—at least if one believes, as many scholars do—that
accredited investor status does not equate to sophistication”); see Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich,
Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV.
291, 293 (1994); Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated
Investor,” 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 253, 262–63 (2010). The SEC’s recently expanded definition of
accredited investor allows individuals to qualify for this status based on certain professional
certifications or credentials. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 115. Although
this change may alleviate concern regarding the sophistication of at least some accredited investors, the
SEC has opened the door to investing in private company stock to a greater number of investors, and
individuals may still qualify based on their income or assets.
253. Velikonja, supra note 19, at 1887–88; see id. at 1916–29, 1937–38 (discussing harms to
creditors, employees, the government, and communities); see also Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is
About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 572 (2020)
(“Massive, socially impactful companies may do very well by their shareholders, but by operating out of
the public eye, they can do significant harm to their employees, customers, and competitors.”).
254. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 339–42; Sale, supra note 248, at 1046
(“Disclosure’s purpose, then, is to diminish asymmetries and the space for fraud, both for those within
the entity and for the public affected by the entity.”); Sale & Thompson, supra note 207, at 487–88,
526–31 (arguing that securities litigation encompasses a broader set of goals related to publicness,
including market protection, innovation, growth, stability, and systemic considerations). See generally
Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License (Feb. 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403706 [https://perma.cc/SKZ2RPEC]) (exploring how failure to account for the public nature of corporate actions can result in the loss
of social license).
255. See MAYNARD ET AL., supra note 125, at 337–39.
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or leverage to negotiate.256 Particularly where there is a vulnerable or harmed
class of employees, the SEC may be better positioned to take action as the harmed
individuals may not have the means to pursue action, and courts might find that
employees who are only option holders lack standing.257
Finally, one study explored the factors that correlate with higher or lower levels of fraud around the time of an IPO, finding that firms’ incentives to commit
fraud interact with investors’ beliefs and monitoring incentives.258 The study
found that “voluntary monitoring by institutional investors or venture capitalists
is less effective at reducing fraud when investors are optimistic about an industry’s prospects.”259 Thus, “[i]f regulators want to reduce fraud in order to avoid
[the] externalities and negative consequences of fraud, more regulatory vigilance
in good times may be needed.”260 This research suggests that as the private capital
market grows, the SEC should proportionately scale or otherwise increase its
enforcements efforts and remain engaged even during periods of growth and enthusiasm.261 Federal prosecutors and state regulators may also have an increased
role to play to effectuate an optimal quantity and quality of enforcement.262
C. ADJUSTING THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE LINE

The debate engaged thus far operates on the existing regulatory framework and
considers how greater public oversight and enforcement are warranted given the
growth of the private capital market and the weakness of private securities litigation. The discussion has also highlighted a concern that some of the shareholders
and option holders in the private market will not be wealthy, sophisticated, or
have access to information and may be more easily misled or kept in the dark.
Further, retail investors are now exposed to the private market through mutual
and pension funds, just as they are to the public market—and more broadly, other
stakeholders such as consumers may also be impacted by private companies that
are not subjected to the discipline that securities fraud class actions can impose.

256. See Caroline Moon, 16 Things to Know About the 409A Valuation, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ,
https://a16z.com/2020/02/13/16-things-about-the-409a-valuation [https://perma.cc/JBL2-RMN7] (last
visited Oct. 10, 2020).
257. See Bodie, supra note 220 (discussing case law that dismissed claims under Rule 10b–5 brought
by employees who held stock options for lack of standing); Cable, supra note 130, at 622–28 (discussing
vulnerability of unicorn employees); Fan, supra note 130, at 585, 603–05 (same).
258. See Tracy Yue Wang, Andrew Winton & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Fraud and Business
Conditions: Evidence from IPOs, 65 J. FIN. 2255, 2256, 2287 (2010).
259. Id. at 2257; see also id. at 2256–57 (“[W]hen venture capitalists are present or when venture
capitalists enjoy a high level of industry expertise, fraud is less likely for low investor beliefs but more
likely for high investor beliefs.”).
260. Id. at 2257.
261. See id. at 2287.
262. See Berdejó, supra note 29, at 572–73; Park, supra note 123, at 117–22; Andrew K. Jennings,
State Securities Enforcement 12–30 (June 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(surveying state securities enforcers); cf. Johnson, supra note 31, at 198 (arguing that “Congress or the
SEC should return to the states the power to enforce private placement standards” to “allow states some
meaningful measure of authority to protect investors in the more dangerous private markets”).
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The observations highlighted in this Article, therefore, not only raise the possible need for greater public oversight and enforcement in the private market
but also point to a larger issue and potential policy response—a redrawing of the
public–private line. A growing scholarly debate has generated a variety of proposals to this end, but it has focused on the need for disclosure as the rationale
rather than the problem of securities fraud. The motivating philosophy of our
securities law framework, however, envisions both disclosure and enforcement
against fraud as reinforcing mechanisms for protection of investors and the general public. This Article may therefore bolster the rising voices pushing for reexamination of the public–private divide.
The literature, for example, includes scholarship that champions redrawing the
public–private line with a tiered approach by reference either to market capitalization or trading volume.263 One such proposal would require companies that hit
the public threshold to go through a seasoning period, during which they would
make periodic disclosures, before making public offerings.264 Supporting this
view is the promise that it might promote efficient capital formation, eliminate
waste currently associated with IPOs, and more vigorously protect unsophisticated investors in the public markets.265 More broadly, the proposals for a tiered
approach, particularly by trading volume, harken back to the original idea that
gave rise to Section 12(g) and cohere with the logic of needing public
disclosure.266
Other scholars have proposed a system of scaled disclosure that would account
for the social footprint or “publicness” of large companies.267 These arguments
recognize that theoretical justifications for mandatory disclosure are grounded in
benefits to all citizens, not only investors.268 Further, a graduated approach to
263. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 63, at 1002 (proposing “a two-tier market for both primary and
secondary transactions keyed to investor sophistication” using “[a]n easily measured quantitative
benchmark—market capitalization or trading volume”); Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1561 (discussing
proposals to require mandatory disclosure based on active trading of a company’s shares or size of
public float).
264. Pritchard, supra note 63, at 1002.
265. See, e.g., id.
266. See Rodrigues, supra note 70, at 1561; Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While
Protecting Investors–Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 43 (2012) (prepared statement of Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Fin., Warrington Coll. of Bus.
Admin., Univ. of Fla.); Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors–
Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 65–66 (2011)
(prepared statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law Sch.);
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,
70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722–23 (1984) (explaining policy rationales for mandatory disclosure under
securities law); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1436–37 (1989) (same).
267. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 342; see also Sale, supra note 248, at 1046
(arguing the purposes of disclosure extend beyond investors to the public).
268. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 266, at 722 (explaining the social interest in an allocatively efficient
capital market and arguing that mandatory disclosure provides a public good); de Fontenay, supra note
103, at 487 (discussing mandatory disclosure as a public good); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415
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public disclosure might better reflect the different types of corporations and their
societal impacts.269
Without further study of the frequency and magnitude of fraud in the private
market, it is far from clear that a bold redrawing of the public–private line would
be justified on that basis alone. The growth of the private market relatively free
from securities fraud scrutiny does, however, present a new argument in favor of
at least taking a hard look at the issue. Political economy forces could have led
the SEC to allow for private capital market growth beyond its optimal size, or the
expansion might be the unintended consequence of a series of smaller regulatory
and market changes.270
As the SEC expands access to the private market and liberalizes restrictions on
capital formation, it is particularly important to reflect on whether these goals are
appropriate and whether they could be achieved while lessening the harms of
fraud in the private market.271 The public–private line could be redrawn to create
a larger public sphere or smaller measures along that path could be considered,
such as fixing easily manipulated metrics such as “record” shareholders or allowing for some measure of short selling in the private market to create a mechanism
for downward price pressure and signaling.
D. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO INCREASE ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRIVATE
COMPANIES

Another broader implication of the developments discussed in this Article is
that securities fraud might operate somewhat differently in the private company
context. Some of the conventional “gatekeepers,” such as securities analysts and
credit rating agencies are absent from the private market.272 Without a public
market and active trading, there are no stock price drops for plaintiffs’ attorneys
to find potential class actions with low search costs.
With these differences in mechanisms to identify and enforce securities fraud,
the nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators) may take
(1999) (“[T]he primary function of disclosure is . . . efficiency in the real economy, not investor
protection.”); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 376–78 (discussing how securities regulation
reflects efforts to prevent corporate externalities that impact the public and that “transparency,
accountability, and openness to external voices are expected of large American corporations”); Lipton,
supra note 253, at 502–03 (explaining that the U.S. system of disclosure is premised on investor
protection but serves broader societal needs of the general public).
269. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 63, at 379 (proposing to “separate out the largest
issuers (public issuers) for full publicness treatment rather than just exempting the smallest”); see also
Fan, supra note 130, at 583 (arguing for “enhanced disclosure requirements that will alleviate the risks
of unicorns”); Schwartz, supra note 88, at 531 (proposing a “lifecycle model” in which “regulations
would adapt to firms as they age”).
270. See Gubler, supra note 116, at 753; Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities
Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435, 468–73 (2017) (describing the political context and industry players
involved in the passage of the JOBS Act).
271. See Pritchard, supra note 63, at 1024 (“[W]e should funnel transactions to the venues that make
it most difficult to get away with fraud.”).
272. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1–3
(2006) (defining “gatekeepers,” and listing as examples auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, creditrating agencies, and investment bankers).
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on greater importance as monitors in the private market.273 The Theranos case,
for example, highlights the role that an employee–whistleblower can play in
bringing alleged fraud to light.274 Employees reached out to the media, which
then investigated and reported to the public, attracting the attention of the SEC
and the DOJ.275 Other regulators, such as the Food and Drug Administration, also
took action to protect the public interest.276
Two types of actors hold notable promise: employees and trading marketplaces. Each offers a different potential avenue for increasing accountability in private companies—one internal and one external.
First, employees are particularly well positioned to serve as monitors in private
companies because they are some of the only individuals with access to information. Rank-and-file employees are typically not privy to financing documents, but
they may be involved in technology development, creating marketing materials
and pitch decks, and producing information for the due diligence process. Red
flags can appear in any of these information-producing activities and might alert
employees to potential securities fraud and allow them to gather relevant information that could be brought to light.
Further, because employees in startups frequently hold stock options or shares
of common stock, they may have more incentive to take on this monitoring role
or serve as whistleblowers.277 Not only are they equity holders, they may in some
sense be understood as the residual claimants to the value of the firm.278 The flip
side of this point is that stock options might in some circumstances have the opposite effect of encouraging employees to hide fraud or participate in it as they
may believe exposure could affect their own financial reward or result in retaliation. Whistleblower protections and rewards can provide important incentives for
employees to come forward, but they can also be gamed or manipulated by
employees.279 For these reasons, relying on employees for fraud detection is
273. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?,
65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213, 2251 (2010) (finding that fraud detection “takes a village, including several
nontraditional players [such as] employees, media, and industry regulators” and that having access to
information or monetary rewards has a significant impact on the probability a stakeholder becomes a
whistleblower).
274. See CARREYROU, supra note 8, at 186–200 (describing the role of the employee–whistleblower).
275. Id. at 296.
276. See id. at 274–75.
277. See Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based
Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (2007) (proposing that “recipient employees be viewed as
potential monitors of other employees and . . . stock options (or similar types of compensation) motivate
them to fulfill this task”).
278. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (equating the common
shareholders in venture-backed startups to residual claimants). For commentary critiquing an approach
to fiduciary duty that fails to maximize aggregate firm value, see Robert P. Bartlett III, Shareholder
Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 259–60 (2015); William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1877 (2013); and
Pollman, supra note 99, at 216–20.
279. See, e.g., Lynne Bernabei, Alan Kabat, Richard Levine & Kristen Sinisi, Navigating the
Nuances of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Claims, 65 PRAC. LAW. 42, 42–44 (2019)
(providing overview of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions); Matt A. Vega,
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likely insufficient but could be given a better chance of success by exploring new
mechanisms to provide employees with greater incentives to serve as early whistleblowers or increase their voice in governance, such as through board access or
work councils.280
Relatedly, another approach would not rely on employees as a resource but
rather would recognize that they are the key group to protect from securities fraud
harm in the private market. To the extent that private equity and venture capital
investors are sophisticated and do not need protection, the greatest concern is for
the class of working investors in private companies—the employees with equitybased compensation.
For years, federal securities law has magnified the importance of private
exemptions and accredited investor status while turning a blind eye to concerns
about startup employees. A fresh evaluation of Rule 701 on compensatory offerings is warranted, with an understanding that startup employees make important,
firm-specific investments.281 Rather than easing disclosure requirements by raising the Rule 701 threshold,282 the SEC could take an approach that looks at the
changing informational needs of working investors and better recognizes their
particular needs and vulnerabilities.283 The response to securities fraud in the
Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act
“Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 509–13 (2012) (discussing how the SEC’s “bounty program”
sends a message that whistleblowers “respond only to radical financial incentives” and could “suppress[]
‘real’ whistleblowing by over incentivizing external whistleblowing”).
280. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 948,
961 (2007) (arguing for stakeholder governance); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The
Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2426
(2020) (arguing for increased worker voice in corporate governance); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair
and Sustainable Capitalism 5–6 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 [https://perma.cc/E7D4-4C2S] (proposing
rule requiring “boards of large, socially important companies to create workforce committees to address
workforce issues at the board level”).
281. See Aran, supra note 130, at 870 (“Employee recipients of equity compensation are generally
not financially sophisticated, and, typically, they do not qualify as accredited investors who would be
permitted to participate in a private placement of their employers’ securities.”); Lynn A. Stout, On the
Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 265 (“By locking in capital, board governance also
attracts firm-specific investments and commitments from a variety of other groups. . . . Employees from
the shop floor to the corner office may be more willing to acquire firm-specific skills and to contribute
extra hours and extra effort.” (footnote omitted)).
282. Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 3310520, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,940, 34,940 (July 18, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/2018/33-10520.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9NR-8WSK] (raising from $5 million to $10
million the aggregate sales price or amount of securities sold during any consecutive twelve-month
period in excess of which an issuer is required to deliver to employees certain disclosures, including
financial statements). The SEC has also issued a concept release soliciting public comment about ways
to modernize Rule 701. See Concept Release on Compensatory Securities Offerings and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 33-10521, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,958, 34,958 (July 18, 2018) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 230), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2018/33-10521.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JHQ-CC3H].
283. See Aran, supra note 130, at 875–76 (proposing that Rule 701 be amended to disclose waterfall
analysis describing “employee’s personalized expected payout in various exit scenarios” with
“appropriate caveats” about risk); see also Alon-Beck, supra note 128, at 186 (noting that “[r]ank-andfile employees might be naı̈ve,” and suggesting that “[p]erhaps the approach should go even further, and
require that unicorns adhere to the same financial disclosure requirements as public companies”); Cable,
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private market might thus look quite different from the public market paradigm
of securities class actions while responding to the vulnerabilities of those most
affected.
Second, a different potential avenue for increasing accountability in private
companies could look to the trading marketplaces to play a stronger role as gatekeepers.284 Aided by deregulatory efforts, such as new exemptions for private
resales of securities,285 these intermediaries have been allowed to follow client
preferences in facilitating liquidity events.286 The marketplaces are presumably
motivated by the fees that they earn for providing services, and the incentive of
their client companies is to create a liquidity opportunity for certain investors,
founders, and employees while maintaining control over their shareholder base to
avoid hitting the Section 12(g) threshold for public reporting.
With a hot market of willing buyers, this dynamic may give rise to a market
failure for information to be produced.287 The lack of mandatory, standardized
disclosures could allow for some private companies to engage in issuances or
facilitate trading without providing basic information such as audited financial
statements that are fundamental building blocks in the public market for accurate
pricing. The least sophisticated investors in the marketplace may be either subsidizing the smart money or victims of fraud.288
A range of oversight and regulatory initiatives related to these trading marketplaces could strengthen private company accountability. The SEC could require
them to collect and report data regarding the trading of private companies,
supra note 130, at 613 (“[S]tartup employees may be relatively capable investors in a company’s early
stages . . . but poorly equipped to navigate the risks of a mature startup.”); Fan, supra note 130 (arguing
for enhanced disclosure requirements on unicorn companies).
284. Other gatekeepers, such as attorneys, are present but may be ineffective or conflicted because
they sometimes invest in their clients or take equity-based compensation. See COFFEE, JR., supra note
272, at 362 (“Law and accounting . . . protect their autonomy; they resist broad duties to the public; and
they invest very little in self-policing.”); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in
Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 408–10 (2002)
(observing that “lawyer equity investment in client ventures has become more routine” for law firms
representing startups); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring Independent
Judgment of the General Counsel—A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1, 31 (2005) (concluding
that boards of public companies should eliminate stock options from compensation for the general
counsel to maintain independent judgment and candor).
285. See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, sec. 71003,
§ 102, 129 Stat. 1312, 1783–84 (2015). The FAST Act incorporated Sections of the Reforming Access
for Investments in Startup Enterprises (RAISE) Act of 2015, which amends the 1933 Act by creating a
safe harbor in a new Section 4(a)(7) to exempt from registration certain resales of securities to
accredited investors. See id. sec. 76001, § 4, 129 Stat. at 1787–90; H.R. 1839, 114th Cong. (2015).
286. Several years ago, SharesPost itself came under SEC scrutiny for matching buyers and sellers of
private company stock without registering as a broker–dealer. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Announces Charges from Investigation of Secondary Market Trading of Private
Company Shares (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-43htm [https://
perma.cc/X85B-SDNV].
287. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 266, at 738 (discussing agency costs and conflicts of interest that
prevent voluntary disclosure).
288. See KUPOR, supra note 164, at 29–32 (“[A] small percentage of [VC] firms capture a large
percentage of the returns to the industry.”).
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including trading volume, participants, and the type of information disclosed.
Consistent oversight of this trading data could better position the SEC to detect
potential instances of securities fraud and launch further investigations. This pool
of data would primarily capture larger, more mature private companies, which
would be underinclusive by nature but a clear starting point involving little cost.
Furthermore, the SEC could require a minimum level of disclosure for private
secondary trading in order to fit within a registration exemption.289 The trading
marketplaces would then be enlisted in the role of regulator along the lines that
exchanges have played for over a century.290
These regulatory changes would not only enrich the informational environment
of private company stock trading but would also incorporate the monitoring function of another set of gatekeepers—auditors.291 A variation on this concept could
require that executives such as the CEO and CFO provide a certification attesting
to the accuracy and fair representation in all material respects of certain information provided to investors, such as financial reports.292 Although private market
participants might prefer the relatively lax status quo, strengthening controls and
improving information is an alternative to forcing public company status while
still ultimately promoting the integrity of the private market. On the whole, these
alternative mechanisms could significantly bolster efforts to increase public
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
In a relatively short amount of time, our U.S. capital markets have bifurcated
from a dominant public realm to a new reality of two markets—public and private. The explosive growth of the private market rivals the public in terms of aggregate size. With companies staying private longer, much of their growth occurs
outside the public market and subject to relatively light securities fraud scrutiny
and enforcement. Without the discipline that mandatory disclosure can impose,
information asymmetries abound fostering the characteristic ingredients for
fraud.
The primary mechanism for policing securities fraud in the public market—
securities class actions—has not played a significant role in the private capital
market. Rule 10b–5 jurisprudence and practice has developed over decades
289. See Pollman, supra note 29, at 222–26 (arguing for minimum disclosures in private company
stock trading).
290. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997) (arguing
that the benefits of securities exchanges provide rules and enforcement mechanisms to protect investors
and increase their returns).
291. See COFFEE, JR., supra note 272, at 108–91 (examining the role of auditors as gatekeepers).
292. Officer certification requirements from the public corporation context established by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) could be adapted to the private company context, even without
audited financial statements and public disclosures. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 7241 (2018). An affirmative certification requirement can encourage corporate executives to be
actively engaged in the company’s financial reporting and to focus their attention on the importance of
accurate and complete disclosure. See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107
GEO. L.J. 923, 951–52 (2019) (discussing the SOX certification requirement).
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through a public company paradigm. In the private company context, the lack of
information, rich and transparent pricing, the presence of impediments to aggregate litigation, and different economics for bringing suit create friction for plaintiffs’ attorneys.
It is therefore more pressing than ever to consider how and whether the private
capital market is policed for securities fraud, and more broadly, the implications
of allowing this market to grow relatively unfettered. This Article identifies several potential responses, including increasing public enforcement, adjusting the
public–private line, and implementing alternative mechanisms for accountability
such as giving more information to employees and regulating trading marketplaces. Although caution is needed to avoid impinging upon the engine of growth
and innovation that our private capital market represents, the potential harm to
shareholders and vulnerable stakeholders likely warrants some mix of response
that increases oversight, enforcement, and accountability. Looking further ahead,
the policymaking imperative to take action raises deeper questions about the
ongoing tenability of maintaining the health and integrity of these bifurcated
markets. The past twenty-five years of opening the private market and relaxing
its rules has fueled an alternate universe to its public parallel, which becomes
harder to distinguish yet offers few of the same protections and disciplining
mechanisms.

